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INCOME AVERAGING AFTER TWENTY YEARS:
A FAILED EXPERIMENT IN
HORIZONTAL EQUITY
RICHARD SCHMALBECK*
After describing the current provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code relating to income averaging, Professor Schmalbeck analyzes
those provisions from a policy perspective. He concludes that the con-
ventional horizontal equity arguments advanced in defense of income
averaging are insubstantial, and that no other policy justification is of
sufficient strength to justify the large revenue loss associated with in-
come averaging. Although outright repeal of the averaging provisions
may be the best solution, Professor Schmalbeck also explores several
more modest amendments to the averaging provisions.
Two durable fixtures of the federal income tax are its annual ac-
counting requirement and its graduated rate structure.' The presence
of these two features is thought to generate a horizontal equity problem
between two groups of taxpayers: those whose incomes fluctuate
widely from year to year and those who enjoy a relatively steady flow
of income. Horizontal equity demands that taxpayers who have equal
incomes be taxed equally. A progressive income tax assessed annually,
however, will tax an individual with a lifetime income of 50x more
heavily if his income pattern consists of alternating years of zero in-
come and 2x income than if his income were x in each year.2
* Professor of Law, Duke University. I am grateful to my research assistants David Cohen,
Eileen Mallon, and Barbara Tobin who, despite their fervent hopes that they will be averaging
their own incomes soon, have given unstintingly in aid of my criticisms of income averaging. I am
also grateful to Marvin Chirelstein, Charles Clotfelter, Walter Dellinger, Pamela Gann, Robert
Hartman, Thomas Rowe, and Patricia White for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
article. Finally, I am grateful to the Duke University Law School for awarding me a Eugene T.
Bost Research Professorship for the Fall 1983 semester, when the research for this article was
accomplished.
1. The durability of the graduated rate structure may be debatable, but I believe it will
survive. Even the advocates of so-called "flat rate" tax structures have generally proposed rate
schedules that have several graduated brackets. The most significant proposal, the Bradley-
Gephart bill, S. 1421, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S7837 (daily ed. June 8, 1983), has, in
effect, four brackets with rates ranging from 0 to 30%.
2. This will be true if the other factors affecting tax liability-for example, family size, de-
ductions, credits-are the same for both taxpayers, and if an income of 2x is exposed to a higher
rate of tax than is an income of x. It is not intuitively obvious to everyone that a taxpayer whose
income fluctuates will, absent relief, pay a higher lifetime tax than he would if his income were
steady. In the example in the text, he will pay more tax in years when his income is 2x, but less
tax in years when his income is 0. How do we know that the net of these greater and lesser tax
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The penalty associated with income fluctuation can be quite se-
vere. The magnitude of the fluctuation penalty3 obviously varies with
the degree of fluctuation. However, to give an example, a taxpayer
with a two-year income of $40,000 would pay nearly sixty percent more
tax if he received that income entirely in one year than he would if he
had received an income of $20,000 in each of two years.
4
Prior to 1964, Congress made only piecemeal responses to this
problem.5 In 1964, however, after prolonged debate among tax ana-
lysts, 6 and in response to President Kennedy's request,7 Congress en-
acted, in the Revenue Act of 1964,8 general income averaging
provisions that applied to any eligible electing taxpayer whose current
year's income was sufficiently greater-as defined by the statute-than
his average income over the preceding four years. Those provisions
amounts inevitably results in higher total tax? An informal proof follows: If we break down an
income of 2x into two tiers-the first x dollars of income and the next x dollars of income-we
can compute the rates of tax, r, and r2, respectively, that each tier is exposed to. These may be
single marginal rates, or composites of several marginal rates, if an income of x is large enough to
spread across more than one marginal bracket. Since we have assumed a progressive tax, we
know thatrl < r2 . Comparing our fluctuating-income taxpayer to another taxpayer whose income
is x every year, we can see that the tax savings of our fluctuating-income taxpayer in years of 0
income will be xr1 , and the taxpenalty in years of 2x income (the additional tax paid over what
the steady-income taxpayer pays) will bexr2 . Since r, < r2 , then xr1 < xr 2 . The tax saved in lean
years, then, is systematically less than the extra tax paid in the high-income years, and there is thus
a net penalty for having a fluctuating income exposed to a progressive tax.
3. "Fluctuation penalty" is not a term of art, but will be used throughout this article to
mean the difference between the tax liability on any specified stream of annual taxable incomes
and the tax liability that would have been incurred had the same total taxable income been re-
ceived over the same period in equal annual amounts.
4. I.R.C. § l(a)(3) (1982). This computation and all subsequent tax computations in this
article, unless otherwise noted, are based on taxable income on a joint return filed for a tax year
beginning in 1984. The total tax on two years of $20,000 income would be $4922; on an income of
$40,000 received in a single year, the tax would be $7858, or 59.7% more.
5. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 348 (codified at I.R.C. § 1341 (1982)
(providing relief to the extent that a fluctuation in income is caused by the repayment of an
amount received in a prior year under a claim of right)).
6. See, e.g., Carroll, Fluctuating Income, in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
86TH CONG., IST SEss., 1 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENINO THE TAX
BASE 629, 629 (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM) (suggesting
that fluctuation penalty would only be relieved by a reduction in degree of progression of tax
rates); HartAveraging Taxable Income, in TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 645, 660 (suggesting sim-
ple averaging over five to seven years); Newman, Taxation of Fluctuating Income, in TAX REVI-
SION COMPENDIUM 669, 672 (suggesting lifetime averaging system); Steger, Averaging Incomefor
Income Tax Purposes, TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 589, 599 (suggesting short-term optional
averaging device).
7. See President's 1963 Tax Message, reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1429, 1438-39.
8. Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 232, 78 Stat. 19, 105-12 (1964) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§§ 1301-1305 (1982)).
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were substantially simplified by the Tax Reform Act of 19699 and are
now widely used by taxpayers. More than six and a half million re-
turns filed for the 1981 tax year'0 included an election to apply income
averaging, resulting in an aggregate savings to the electing taxpayers of
nearly four billion dollars."I The loss of revenue by itself demonstrates
the importance of the income averaging provisions in our present Inter-
nal Revenue Code (Code). In fact, the revenue importance of income
averaging has led to very recent amendments to the income averaging
provisions intended to make averaging less costly to the Treasury as a
means of reducing the federal budget deficit.' 2 In addition, income
averaging provides an interesting case study in the ways in which pur-
suit of a fundamental but highly elusive tax policy goal-horizontal
equity-can go awry.
This article provides an explanation and analysis of how the in-
come averaging provisions work, followed by an assessment of how
well they serve the traditional tax policy goals of fairness, efficiency,
administrability, economic stabilization, and revenue raising. Because
income averaging was added to the Code almost entirely out of fairness
considerations, the bulk of this section will be devoted to issues arising
9. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 311, 83 Stat. 487, 586-88 (1969) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 1302 (1982)). The primary simplification of income averaging provisions resulted from elimina-
tion of the requirement that capital gains, income from gifts, and gambling income be excluded
from the ambit of averaging.
10. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1981, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURNS 72 (1983) (Table 3.1, col. 1) [hereinafter 1981 STATISTICS OF INCOME]. This table
presents an IRS estimate, based on a sampling of actual returns, that 6,569,730 returns reflected an
income averaging election in 1981. This represents about 6.9% of all individual returns filed.
11. Id at 73 (Table 3.1, col. 17). The IRS estimate of the savings was $3,919,441,000. In fact,
this estimate may be a modest overstatement of the net taxpayer savings from income averaging,
because the election of income averaging requires that the taxpayer forego certain other elections
that might, in the absence of averaging, have reduced a taxpayer's tax liability below the statutory
amount. See I.R.C. § 1304(b) (1982). By far the most significant of these foregone opportunities,
however, was the ability to use the maximum tax provisions that were, until 1981, embodied in
I.R.C. § 1348. With the reduction in maximum rates accomplished by the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101(c), 95 Stat. 172, 183, repealing I.R.C.§ 1348 (1976), the
maximum tax was repealed. Because the other elections barred by I.R.C. § 1304(b) (1982) relate
to income earned by U.S. citizens or residents living abroad, I.R.C. § 911 (1982), and income from
United States possessions, I.R.C. § 931 (1982), it seems safe to conclude that the election of in-
come averaging no longer entails any significant foregone opportunities for most taxpayers.
12. On July 18, 1984, shortly before the final printing of this issue, the President signed into
law the Tax Reform Act of 1984, enacted as Division A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-369, § 173, 98 Stat. 494, 703-04 (1984) (amending I.R.C. §§ 1301-1302 (1982)). The
modifications to income averaging contained in this legislation are explained and briefly analyzed
in section V of this article, styled "Afterword."
Attention has also focused on complete repeal of income averaging as a possible deficit-re-
ducing option. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND
REVENUE OPTIONS 312-13 (1983); S. REP. No. 2062, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 41 (1983); M. BROWN,
TAX CHOICES 35-37 (1983).
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under that criterion. The section concludes that the income averaging
system is largely unnecessary, perhaps even counterproductive. Al-
though outright repeal of income averaging is probably the most satis-
factory remedy, this article concludes by examining several more
modest legislative changes that could significantly improve the existing
system.
I. EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF INCOME AVERAGING
A. The Averaging Computation.
Sections 1301 through 1305 of the Code allow eligible taxpayers to
elect a tax computation method that is based on the taxpayer's income
in the tax year for which the return is being prepared (the "computa-
tion year" 13) and the income in the preceding four tax years (the "base
period"14). This is a "rolling" averaging system, so if a taxpayer con-
tinues to be eligible, he may elect to employ the averaging provisions in
any number of consecutive years. Each new tax year can be a compu-
tation year, with the new base period consisting of the previous year's
computation year plus the preceding three tax years. The averaging
mechanism operates with respect to a taxpayer's total taxable income.
It requires first computing "averagable income,"' 5 which is the amount
by which taxable income in the computation year exceeds thirty per-
cent of total base-period taxable income, 16 and then applying to that
averagable income the marginal tax rate or rates that would have ap-
plied had that averagable income been received evenly over the five-
year period (the four base-period years plus the computation year), in
addition to an income in each of those years equal to thirty percent of
the base-period income.
17
As the preceding discussion may suggest, it is extremely difficult to
describe the income averaging computations accurately without falling
into the soporific syntax of the instructions found on tax forms: Take
the excess of this over twice the amount of that, and multiply the result
by some other apparently arbitrary amount. After even a few such
13. I.R.C. § 1302(c)(1) (1982).
14. I.R.C. § 1302(c)(2) (1982).
15. I.R.C. § 1302(a) (1982).
16. I.R.C. § 1302(a)(1) (1982) defines averagable income as that part of the taxable income in
the computation year which exceeds 120% of average base-period income, and I.R.C. § 1302(b)(1)
(1982) defines average base-period income, logically enough, as one-fourth of the sum of the in-
comes in the four base-period years. I have collapsed these two provisions in the text for simplic-
ity into a single computation using 30%, which is simply one-fourth of 120%.
17. I.R.C. § 1301 (1982).
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steps, the intuitive thread running through many Code provisions-in-
eluding the ones under discussion here-becomes hopelessly tangled.
The intuitive thread here, though, is really quite straightforward.
A taxpayer who has for several years earned a salary of $10,000 will
note a dramatic increase in her marginal tax rate if she wins $100,000
in a lottery. Much of that income will be taxed at rates as high as forty-
five percent.'8 But if the taxpayer is allowed to divide the extra amount
into five $20,000 slices, and to compute her tax as though one slice had
been received in each of the five most recent tax years, then the lottery
winnings will be taxed at the substantially lower rates that apply to
incremental incomes between her $10,000 normal income and a hypo-
thetical $30,000 income. 19
Income averaging under the Code approximates the latter result,
but not uniformly so. Illustration of the imperfections of the present
averaging device requires a slightly more elaborate model-one that
will be explained with something approaching technical accuracy. Im-
agine a graduated rate structure of the most elementary sort: one that
taxes the first $10,000 of taxable income at a marginal rate of ten per-
cent and all taxable income above $10,000 at a marginal rate of twenty
percent. Table I presents the taxable income of a hypothetical taxpayer
over a five-year period; column 3 of that table presents the tax com-
puted under the rate structure given above if there were no averaging
provisions.
Table I
1 2 3 4
Year Income Tax w/o Averaging Tax w/Averaging
1 $3000 $300 $300
2 4000 400 400
3 6000 600 600
4 7000 700 700
5 30,000 5000 3400
Total 50,000 7000 5400
Applying the income averaging provisions to this income pattern
would first involve computing the averagable income. This is the com-
putation-year income of $30,000, minus thirty percent of the base-pe-
riod income (which totals $20,000). Averagable income is thus $24,000
18. For taxable years beginning in 1984, a 45% rate applies to all taxable income between
$85,600 and $109,400 for taxpayers filing joint returns. I.R.C. § l(a)(3) (1982).
19. Taxable income between $10,000 and $30,000 on a 1984 joint return is exposed to a series
of rates ranging from 14% to 28%. Id
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($30,000 - $6,000). This $24,000 is then divided into five equal slices
of $4800 each. These $4800 increments are taxed as though they were
received in each year in addition to $6000, which is thirty percent of
base-period income. Thus, the tax on the $4800 increments is com-
puted as though that amount were the last $4800 of a $10,800 income.
Under the stipulated rate schedule, the tax rates applied to the $4800
increments would be ten percent of the first $4000 plus twenty percent
of the last $800, producing a tax on each increment of $560.
Because these increments of averagable income have never been
taxed before, all five must be taxed in the computation year. In addi-
tion, that part of the computation year's income which was not avera-
gable income must also be taxed. Thus, the tax in the computation
year under the Code's averaging mechanism is five times $560, plus the
$600 of tax computed on the $6000 of nonaveragable income. This
amount is shown in column 4 of Table I.
This example illustrates several aspects of income averaging
mechanics that seem worth noting at this point, although their full sig-
nificance will not be considered until later in this article. First, this
mechanism provides no immediate relief in situations where income in
the computation year declines from the four-year base-period average.
In such a case, there is simply no averagable income to be spread back
to those base-period years. This seems odd because the tax penalty
imposed on fluctuating incomes is symmetrical: generally, income
flows of 2x and zero in a two-year period will be taxed more heavily
than income flows of x in each year, and the amount of the penalty will
be the same regardless of whether the year of zero income precedes or
follows the year with income of 2x. The present income averaging
scheme, however, permits taxpayers to spread income from a current
high-income year back to prior low-income years, but not to spread the
effects of prior high-income years forward to a current low-income
year.
This anomaly in the federal income-averaging system was not spe-
cifically proposed by any of the proponents of averaging who appeared
before Congress prior to the 1964 adoption of the averaging system.20
Nor has it met with the approval of tax commentators since.2' The stat-
20. Indeed, the experts who proposed fully-articulated income-averaging systems would have
included downward fluctuations. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 6, at 633; Dickerson, Taxation of
Fluuctuating Income, TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 621, 625; Kragen, Effect of
Taxation on Indiiduals with Fluctuating Incomes, supra note 6, at 579, 584-85.
21. See, e.g., David, Groves, Miller & Wiegner, Optimal Choicesfor an Averaging Systetn.A
Simulation Analysis of the FederalAveraging Formula of1964, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 279 (1970); Fergu-
son & Hood, Income Averaging, 24 TAX L. REV. 53, 93 (1968)("Perhaps the most serious inade-
quacy in the 1964 legislation is the lack of provision for downward fluctuations in income.");
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utory history of income averaging is silent on the question of why Con-
gress chose to treat a symmetrical problem with an asymmetrical
solution.22 Several explanations, however, can be imagined. First, the
present system, under which the computation year will always be a
year of relatively high income, has some modest conveniences for the
tax system. That year will be one in which a relatively high tentative
tax liability will exist,23 which may be reduced, but not below zero, by
averaging. No opening of prior returns is required, nor will there be
any refunding of tax liabilities already collected in prior years. 24
But these advantages turn out to be extremely modest in view of
the fact that the Treasury seems to have little problem handling a re-
funding of previously collected taxes in other areas, such as net operat-
ing losses.25 Furthermore, the tax withholding provisions do not take
cognizance of the possibility of income averaging. 26 Thus, with with-
holding based on the current income in the relatively high-income year,
it is likely, even under the present system, that the full amount of the
tax savings resulting from income averaging will have already been col-
Goldberg, Income Averaging Under the Revenue Act of 1964, 74 YALE L.J. 465, 467 (1965); Klein
& Wiegner, Income Averagingfor Tax Purposes-Sources of a Statutory Solution, 60 Nw. U.L.
REv. 147, 159-61 (1965).
22. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 109 (1963).
23. That is, absent averaging, the tax determined under I.R.C. § 1 (1982) would be relatively
high.
24. See Steurele, McHugh, & Sunley, Who Beneftsfrom IncomeAveraging?, 31 NAT'L TAX J.
19, 27 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Steurele].
25. I.R.C. § 172 (1982) permits taxpayers to spread business losses backward for up to three
years (and forward for up to fifteen years), which typically results in a refunding of prior tax
payments; see also infra note 230 and accompanying text.
26. The federal income tax withholding provisions, I.R.C. §§ 3401-3403 (1982), and the regu-
lations thereunder, specify amounts to be withheld from wages on the basis of the amount and
timing of those payments without regard to what the taxpayer's income in prior years may have
been. I.R.C. § 3402(f) (1982) permits a taxpayer to adjust his withholding by providing estimates
of unusual deductions on Form W-4. That form, however, provides no opportunity to reflect a
taxpayer's expectation that his ultimate tax liability will be lowered by income averaging.
Of course, many taxpayers elect to use income averaging because they receive large amounts
of income that, like royalties or capital gains, may not be subject to withholding. Such taxpayers
are likely to be subject to an obligation under I.R.C. § 6015 (1982) to make estimated tax pay-
ments. Like Form W-4, the estimated tax form (Form 1040-ES) does not provide an opportunity
to reflect the fact that the taxpayer's ultimate tax liability may be lowered by income averaging. As
a practical matter, however, many taxpayers who are technically obligated to make estimated tax
payments incur no penalty for their failure to do so because they qualify for one or more of the
exceptions in I.R.C. § 6654(d) (1982), which bar assessment of the penalty under I.R.C. § 6654(a)
(1982) for failure to pay estimated tax. Thus, it can be presumed that a considerable number of
averaging taxpayers, whose computation-year incomes are relatively high due to receipts from
sources that are not subject to withholding, will not be in a situation where averaging will neces-
sarily generate a refund check in the year after the tax year in which averaging was elected.
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lected27 and will have to be refunded to the taxpayer after the return is
filed.28 Thus, from a cash-flow viewpoint, the averaging system is
likely to involve mailing checks to taxpayers out of tax already col-
lected. Nevertheless, the fact that the administrative conveniences of
allowing averaging only in relatively high-income years seem highly
ephemeral is far from conclusive proof that Congress did not enact
those particular averaging provisions to further those putative
conveniences.
There exists, however, another explanation for this asymmetry.
Congress may have intended income averaging to provide relief only to
taxpayers with oscillating incomes-incomes that have cycles, but not
annual cycles. A taxpayer who, for example, spends every even-num-
bered year writing the first half of a book that he completes and sells in
every odd-numbered year will not necessarily be disadvantaged by an
averaging system that permits him to elect to average only in the odd-
numbered years. He may still be able to shift income from years with
relatively high rates to years with lower rates.29 Only the taxpayer who
has a one-time, permanent decrease in income level will never have a
high-income year to use as a computation year to obtain the benefits of
spreading income to achieve a leveling of marginal rates. It is possible
that Congress simply did not wish to extend the benefits of averaging to
this class of taxpayers, especially since this class would include most
taxpayers at the point of their retirement from the labor force, and
would thus be large in number.
Even as to upward fluctuations the federal averaging mechanism
typically provides only partial relief from the tax penalty associated
with irregular income flows. For example, if the hypothetical taxpayer
whose income is shown in Table I had received his five-year income of
$50,000 in even annual amounts of $10,000 per year, his total tax over
27. The average taxpayer typically finds himself in a position to receive a tax refund at year-
end in any case. In 1981, for example, more than three-quarters of all returns reflected overpay-
ment of the tax liability computed. 1981 STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 10, at 89 (Table 3.6,
cols. 51, 57). Although there is no breakdown available with respect to taxpayers electing income
averaging, it seems likely that, because the tax advantage of averaging was not reflected in their
withholding, they are more likely than most taxpayers to have received a refund.
28. Taxpayers can, of course, elect to apply overpayments to the following year's estimated
tax liability. However, over 97% of overpayments are returned to taxpayers, rather than credited
to estimated tax. See, e.g., 1981 STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 10, at 89 (Table 3.6, cols. 51,
53).
29. Of course, if the cycles of income have phases that exceed five years in length, complete
balancing of the rates through averaging may not be possible. It is also true that the present
mechanics appear to be less effective at relieving the bracket effect of one-time "valleys" in a
taxpayer's income stream than they are at relieving the comparable effects of one-time "peaks."
See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
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the five-year period would have been $5000, rather than the $5400 total
produced by the section 1301 computations. Those computations
would have saved him $1600 of the $2000 penalty that he otherwise
would have incurred for having a fluctuating income. Although the
taxpayer would recoup eighty percent of the fluctuation penalty in this
case, the proportion of the fluctuation penalty that is relieved by the
averaging provisions is not consistent. The averaging provisions are
not directly focused on the fluctuation penalty at all and, in fact, the
percentage of the penalty that can be recouped under these provisions
can vary from zero to one hundred percent.
30
Thus, not only is the relief provided by averaging from the over-
taxing of fluctuating incomes uneven, but, worse still, that unevenness
is completely unprincipled. The computational source of this uneven-
ness is that the Code formula inflates the base-period income by using
thirty percent of base-period income to determine averagable income,
31
when the true average of base-period income is simply one-fourth of
the four-year total. When the averagable income is then spread over
the total five-year period, it is stacked on top of this inflated base-pe-
riod number. This may cause all or some of the averagable income to
be exposed to a higher marginal rate than it would under a perfect
averaging system.
3 2
This computational feature of the present income averaging sys-
tem is not the result of an oversight. Indeed, as the averaging provi-
sions were originally enacted in 1964, 33 the problem was even greater,
with one-third of base-period income constituting the "unaveragable"
amount. 34 The committee reports concerning the Tax Reform Act of
1969,35 which reduced the percentage of base-period income that would
be unaveragable, offer an explanation of Congress's original purpose in
30. Although it is possible to reach zero and 100% penalty reduction outcomes under the
actual statute, either extreme is an unlikely special case. The extreme cases can be illustrated as
follows: A 100% penalty reduction would occur where a single taxpayer had taxable income of
$5000 in a 1984 computation year, and $1000 in taxable income for each base-period year. Such a
taxpayer would have a $325 fluctuation penalty, all of which would be eliminated by income
averaging. On the other hand, a taxpayer with an income of $55,000 in 1984 and $35,000 in each
base-period year would incur a fluctuation penalty of $1000, none of which would be relieved by
income averaging.
31. I.R.C. § 1302(a) (1982). More precisely, the formula uses 120% of average base-period
income, rather than 30% of total base-period income. See supra note 16.
32. By "perfect averaging system," I mean one that completely relieves all fluctuation
penalties.
33. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 232(a), 78 Stat. 19, 105 (codified as amended
at I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305 (1982)).
34. Again, the statute spoke in terms of 133% of average base-period income, rather than
one-third of total base-period income. See supra note 16.
35. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 311, 83 Stat. 487, 586-88 (1969).
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setting the unaveragable amount above the twenty-five percent level
that would be necessary for consistently full relief of the fluctuation
penalty:
The [one-third of average base-period income] was included in the
general income averaging adopted in 1963 [the Revenue Act of
1964], in part because it was believed it was necessary to limit for
administrative reasons the availability of a new and unfamiliar pro-
vision to those cases where it was needed most.36
The report further notes that greater familiarity with the provision
from a tax administration view had "reduced the significance of this
consideration. '37 But apparently the significance was not reduced to
zero, because the 1969 amendments, which are reflected in the present
Code, do not eliminate the unevenness and the incompleteness of in-
come averaging relief.
This seems odd at first. If Congress has decided that taxpayers
with fluctuating incomes and those with level incomes should bear
equivhlent burdens, why would it arrange a system that relieves some,
but not all, of the fluctuation penalty and in so irregular a manner?
Congress of course does sometimes decide that fairness dictates a par-
ticular kind of relief, but that the fisc can only afford so much relief.38
That would not seem to be the case here, however. At the time that the
thirty percent of base-period income provision was adopted, income
averaging was little used and rather inexpensive from a revenue view-
point.39 Even if liberalization had somewhat increased the availability
and attractiveness of averaging, it would hardly have been thought a
serious revenue problem at that time.
There is, of course, a lurking tax administration problem of enor-
mous proportions in what might be called "perfect averaging" sys-
tems-those in which every dollar of the fluctuation penalty is returned
to the taxpayer. The fluctuation penalty is measured by reference to a
paradigmatic taxpayer who does not exist: the taxpayer whose income
never varies from year to year.40 If nearly every taxpayer incurs some
36. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 85 (1969).
37. Id
38. For example, the "marriage penalty" deduction in I.R.C. § 221 (1982) reduces, but does
not eliminate, that penalty.
39. At the time of the 1969 legislation, Congress estimated that the income-averaging provi-
sion would cost the Treasury only $300 million in lost revenues annually. See H.R. REP. No. 413,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 254 (1969); S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1969).
40. Technically, the paradigm is the taxpayer whose income varies within a sufficiently nar-
row range that his top marginal rate is the same year after year, so that there is no income shifting
among tax years that would produce a lower total tax. It is doubtful that there are many such
taxpayers, except those who are well into the top bracket; for the latter group, even substantial
income fluctuations may not change their marginal rate.
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fluctuation penalty, then the term is something of a misnomer. Only
that part of this amount that is unusual deserves to be called a penalty;
and, for tax administration purposes, income averaging would be a
cumbersome way to distribute a tax cut to every taxpayer. Congress can
appropriately choose to ensure that not every taxpayer will be able to
benefit from income averaging, and it has essentially two means avail-
able to do this. It can provide a computation formula that limits ac-
cess-as it has done in using thirty percent of base-period income as
the nonaveragable amount. Alternatively, Congress could control the
eligibility in some way extrinsic to the essential averaging mechanism.
As the next section makes clear, Congress has employed both ap-
proaches. The irregularity of the relief that Congress has devised can
only be interpreted as an unintentional and incidental effect of the
methods used to limit, for administrability reasons, the availability of
averaging.
B. Eligibilityfor Income Averaging.
Generally speaking, any individual taxpayer is eligible to elect in-
come averaging in any tax year in which his income is greater than
thirty percent of his total income over the preceding four tax years.
There are four basic exceptions to this rule, generally disqualifying four
types of taxpayers: nonresident aliens,4' taxpayers making certain
other elections under the Code,42 taxpayers having no more than $3000
of averagable income,43 and individuals who received substantial sup-
port from others during their particular base years. 44
1. Nonresident Aliens. Taxpayers who are nonresident aliens at
any time during either the computation year or the four-year base pe-
riod may not elect income averaging in the computation year.45 For
this purpose, determination of nonresident alien status is made in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Code dealing with the income tax
treatment of nonresident aliens generally.
46
41. I.R.C. § 1303(b) (1982); see also I.R.C. § 1303(a) (1982).
42. I.R.C. § 1304(b) (1982).
43. I.R.C. § 1301 (1982). Obviously, this limitation could be viewed as either a part of the
basic averaging computation or as an eligibility criterion. I prefer the latter characterization, be-
cause the $3000 operates simply as a threshold; taxpayers who fail to satisfy this requirement may
not elect averaging, while otherwise eligible taxpayers who do satisfy this requirement may so
elect. In the latter case, the computation of tax in the computation year proceeds as described in
the preceding section, with no further reference to the $3000 minimum.
44. I.R.C. § 1303(c) (1982).
45. I.R.C. § 1303(b) (1982).
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.1303-1(b) (1983) provides specifically that nonresident alien status is to be
determined under Treas. Reg. §§ 1.871-2 to -4 (1983). The legislative history of the income-aver-
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2. Taxpayers Making Disqualifying Elections. At various times,
Congress has decided not to allow a taxpayer to obtain simultaneously
the advantages of income averaging and the benefits of certain other
relief provisions available under the Code. At the present time, the
only elections that are statutorily incompatible with income averaging
are the elections under section 911 (a) to exclude foreign earned income
and housing allowances, 47 and the election under section 931 (a) to ex-
clude income earned in a United States possession other than Puerto
Rico, Guam, or the Virgin Islands.48 The bar on using income averag-
ing if the benefits of sections 911 or 931 are claimed has been a part of
the income averaging provisions since their inception;49 the legislative
history suggests that the bar reflects primarily a concern with verifica-
tion of either income fluctuation or the existence of tax penalties associ-
ated with that fluctuation.
50
aging provisions indicates that Congress felt that exclusion of nonresident aliens from the ambit of
income averaging was important because an individual's averagable income "must have been
subject to tax by the United States throughout the entire base period as well as the computation
year." S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 144, reprintedin 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1673, 1818. Income averaging is premised on the notion that taxpayers are penalized by the un-
fortunate effect of applying progressive rates to fluctuating incomes. Id at 140, reprinted in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD, NEWS at 1814. Because nonresident aliens are not required to declare
their worldwide income on their U.S. tax returns, I.R.C. § 872(a) (1982), the IRS is in no position
to verify either that the taxpayer's total income has fluctuated or that any tax penalty is associated
with such fluctuation. While it is possible to imagine standards under which the taxpayer could be
allowed to prove that a tax penalty had been exacted, such provisions would surely be very com-
plicated. Congress apparently views the relief provided by income averaging as a matter of legis-
lative grace, which it has chosen not to extend to nonresident aliens.
47. See I.R.C. §§ 911(a), 1304(b)(1) (1982).
48. I.R.C. § 1304(b)(2) (1982) makes all of the benefits of subpart D, I.R.C. §§ 931-936
(1982), inapplicable to taxpayers who elect to use income averaging. Technically, the qualified
exclusion of income sourced in a United States possession provided by I.R.C. § 931 (a) (1982) is
not a matter of election; the fact, however, that section 1304(b)(2) makes section 931 inapplicable
to taxpayers who elect income averaging means that individuals otherwise eligible for both section
931 treatment and income averaging have an essentially free choice between them.
49. See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 232, 78 Stat. 19, 108 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305 (1982)).
50. This is also the major concern with respect to nonresident alien eligibility, see supra note
46, but that concern surely has less force when applied to American citizens whose worldwide
income is verifiable. The problem was not discussed fully in Congress. See H.R. REP. No. 749,
88th Cong., Ist Sess. 114, reprintedin 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313, 1423; see also S.
REP. No. 830, supra note 46, at 144, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD, NEWS at 1818.
For tax years between 1969 and 1981, a restriction of much broader significance was the bar
on claiming the benefits of both income averaging and the maximum tax on "earned" or "per-
sonal service" income under section 1348 of the Code. The maximum tax provisions were added
to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 804, 83 Stat. 487, 685-86
(effective for tax years beginning in 1971) (codified at I.R.C. § 1348 (1976)). These provisions
were repealed by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101(c), 95 Stat.
172, 183 (effective for tax years beginning in 1982). The terms "earned" or "personal service"
income applied largely to wages, salaries, an~income from self-employment, and were meant to
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3. Taxpayers Having No More Than $3000 ofAveragable Income.
The disqualification of taxpayers having no more than $3000 of avera-
gable income is not stated in the "eligibility" portion of the income
averaging provisions in section 1303; rather, it is contained in the gen-
eral description of income averaging computation in section 1301. It is
worth listing as a limitation on eligibility, however, to reinforce the
point that many otherwise eligible individuals who have incurred a tax
penalty as a result of income fluctuation will not be allowed to abate
any part of that penalty under section 1301.
The $3000 minimum averagable-income threshold for averaging
eligibility is one of the more unfortunate features of the present averag-
ing provisions. First of all, a flat dollar limit operates to exclude many
more low-income taxpayers from averaging than it does high-income
taxpayers, since a particular percentage income fluctuation produces
less averagable income for the former group than for the latter.51 A
taxpayer with an average base-period income of $5000, for example,
must experience an eighty percent increase over that level in the com-
distinguish such income from investment income. Originally, the concept was labeled "earned"
income. In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 302, 90 Stat. 1520, 1554-55 (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 1348 (1976) (repealed 1981)), Congress made a number of changes in the maxi-
mum tax, one of which was to apply the maximum tax provision to "personal service" income,
perhaps in recognition that income from investments could also be said to be "earned" in the
natural meaning of that term.
Although the bar on using both the maximum tax and income averaging has been obviated
by the former's repeal, it nevertheless provides an interesting example of the willingness of Con-
gress to sacrifice fairness at the altar of simplicity, at least in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. It is
certainly possible to imagine a method of combining the maximum tax and income-averaging
provisions. Because, in effect, the averagable income is sliced into five parts, and taxed as though
received in five equal portions in the four-year base period and the computation year, it would
only be necessary to subdivide the averagable income into a personal-service amount and a non-
personal-service amount, topping off the rates at the 50% maximum for the former but not for the
latter.
In amending the averaging provisions, however, Congress in the 1969 Tax Reform Act had
already gone some distance in the direction of genuine simplification. In the interest of simplicity,
it took at least a mild political risk of appearing to favor gamblers and scions of the rich by
allowing-contrary to the Revenue Act of 1964-averaging of gambling income, and income from
gifts. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 311, 83 Stat. 487, 586-88 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 1302 (1982)). This made averaging simpler by making it unnecessary to adjust each of the five
years' income to take out gambling income and income from gifts before performing the actual
averaging computation. Adding a new subsection-and implicitly creating a new form, or com-
plicating an existing one-to allow simultaneous maximum tax/income-averaging computations
was not something Congress was willing to do. It made no claim that a simultaneous computation
would be excessively favorable; it said only that it would be too complex. See H.R. REP. No. 413,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 209, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1731-33.
51. See infra note 194 and accompanying text for a discussion of the vertical equity problem
created by the $3000 threshold.
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putation year in order to have more than $3000 of averagable income.52
In contrast, a taxpayer with an average base-period income of $50,000
needs only a twenty-six percent increase over that level in the computa-
tion year in order to have more than $3000 of averagable income. 53
Thus, over the course of a five-year period, a person earning $50,000
each year may find that he needs little more than an annual cost-of-
living increase to make him eligible for averaging; the lower-income
taxpayer will rarely find that inflation by itself produces a sufficient
percentage fluctuation to permit averaging.
5 4
4. Individuals Receiving Substantial Support From Others. The
general rule of the support test, expressed in section 1303(c)(1) of the
Code, is that an individual is disqualified from income averaging if he
or his spouse provided less than half of his support during any of the
four base-period years.5 5 Congress's stated concern in the support test
52. ($5000 X 120%) + $3001 = $9001, which is 80% more than the $5000 average base-period
income.
53. ($50,000 x 120%) + $3001 = $63,001, which is only 26% more than the $50,000 average
base-period income. Obviously, because average base-period income is multiplied by 120% to
determine unaveragable income, the minimum fluctuation necessary to be eligible for averaging
approaches a limit of 20%.
54. See infra notes 116-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of inflation-induced aver-
aging. The $3000 threshold also exacerbates the erratic nature of the relief available under in-
come averaging, even to the point of introducing a peculiar discontinuity into the income tax
structure. This is most pronounced at lower income levels and can best be illustrated by an exam-
ple. Imagine a married taxpayer with only $2500 of taxable income in each of four consecutive
years. If he earns $6000 in the fifth year, he will be ineligible for averaging, because he has only
$3000 of averagable income. ($6,000 -($10,000 x 30%) = $3000). He will incur a tax of $291,
based on the rate schedules of I.R.C. § l(a)(3), all of which is a fluctuation penalty, because his
five-year income of $16,000 if evenly distributed over the period, would all have been within the
zero bracket. While not an enormous sum, this $291 is by no means insignificant, especially in
light of the taxpayer's economic circumstances.
If the taxpayer earns $6001 in the fifth year, however, he will have $3001 of averagable in-
come, and will be able to save $181 of the $291 of tentative tax by electing income averaging.
That a single additional dollar of taxable income in the computation year actually reduces tax by
$181 seems highly undesirable. It is also unnecessary. See infra notes 303-20 and accompanying
text for a description of a proposed computational mechanism that is free of irregularities of this
sort.
55. I.R.C. § 1303(c)(1) (1982). This disqualification is subject to a number of exceptions,
each of which has the effect of re-qualifying certain taxpayers who would otherwise be disquali-
fied by the 50% rule. The "nonstudent" exception provides that a taxpayer who has reached the
age of 25, and has not been a full-time student during at least four tax years after his twenty-first
birthday may elect income averaging without having satisfied the self-support requirement. I.R.C.
§ 1303(c)(2)(A) (1982).
The "major accomplishment" exception provides that a taxpayer may elect income averaging
despite failure to satisfy the self-support requirement if more than half his income in the computa-
tion year is attributable to work performed by him in substantial part during two or more of the
base-period years. I.R.C. § 1303(c)(2)(B) (1982). This provision reflects Congress's effort to re-
qualify young authors, painters, and the like, who may have been supported during the years in
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was that the averaging taxpayer "be a member of the labor force in
both the computation year and in the four base period years. ' 56 The
committee reports do not elaborate on why this was thought to be im-
portant, but it seems likely that the primary consideration was to pre-
clude newly emancipated young adults during their first few years of
employment from the virtually automatic qualification for averaging
that would otherwise result from their very-low-income or no-income
years during which they were supported by their parents. This, in turn,
must reflect the view that the low reported incomes in the base periods
of newly emancipated young adults are not truly representative of their
economic situations.
57
which a major opus was produced, but who were, nevertheless, in the work force in some sense
during those years. This exception has sparked several colorful cases. See, e.g., Wilson v. United
States, 322 F. Supp. 830, 832 (D. Kan. 1971) (Miss America title, which could perhaps be attrib-
uted to preliminary work, did notproduce taxpayer's 1965 and 1966 income, but only provided her
with the opportunity to earn income); Heidel v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 95, 106 (1971) (bonus paid
to taxpayer upon signing a professional football contract not paid for college "work," but for
prospective work for the professional team).
The third exception addresses difficulties arising from the interrelationships of joint tax re-
turns and the eligibility of each spouse to average income. A married taxpayer otherwise eligible
for income averaging may elect to average his income on a separate return regardless of whether
his spouse is also eligible for averaging. I.R.C. §§ 1302(b)(3)(C), 1304(c)(2) (1982) (explicitly refer-
ring to averaging by married individuals filing separately). Conversely, if a joint return is filed,
both individuals must be eligible for averaging if the tax of the joint return is to be computed
using the income-averaging provisions. Treas. Reg. § 1.1303-1(a) (1983). Congress, recognizing
that this would often unfairly force taxpayers to choose between the benefits of averaging and the
benefits of filing joint returns, promulgated the "supported spouse" exception. This exception
provides that an individual will be an "eligible individual" for income-averaging purposes despite
having been supported during the base period if the individual's income in the computation year
is no more than 25% of the adjusted gross income shown on a joint return. I.R.C. § 1303(c)(2)(C)
(1982).
56. H. R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1313, 1421. Although Congress claimed to be concerned with labor market participa-
tion, it did not premise eligibility for averaging precisely on that criterion. Rather, it made self-
support-whether from the sweat of the taxpayer's brow or the dividends from his stock-the test.
I.RC. § 1303(c) (1982).
57. Conceptually, this is far from satisfying. To disregard a former student's low- or zero-
income high school years because of his parents' support is, in some sense, to treat him as though
he were receiving part of his parents' income. Yet, beyond the $1000 exemption allowed for his
support, his parents are allowed no income-shifting advantage to reflect the view that some signifi-
cant part of their income was devoted to the support of their son.
There may be, however, a more satisfactory justification for denying the benefits of averaging
to newly emancipated adults. As suggested above in the discussion of the computation mechanics,
income averaging is, and should be, designed to relieve only the effects of unusual fluctuations in
income. Because most people who earn income do have a discrete point at which they first enter
the labor market, it may make sense from a tax policy viewpoint to try to achieve horizontal
equity by withholding income-averaging relief from all such entrants rather than by granting re-
lief to all. This is perhaps analogous to how our tax law treats commuting expenses; they seem
clearly to be costs of earning a living, but because nearly everyone incurs them, it is easier from an
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II. POLICY ANALYSIS OF INCOME AVERAGING
A. Introduction.
The preceding sections were intended to provide an understanding
of the mechanics and availability of the federal income averaging pro-
visions. This section focuses more directly on the policy issues underly-
ing income averaging.
The soundness of a tax system can be evaluated under a number of
criteria. 58 Although the criteria take slightly different shapes in differ-
ent hands, there is general agreement that fairness, efficiency, adminis-
trability, economic stabilization, growth,59 and, of course, the raising of
revenue, are the primary goals in the design of a tax. 60
administrative view, and equally fair, to ignore them. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 92 (3rd ed. 1982).
This is not wholly convincing; even if everyone experiences an entry into the labor market, it
does not follow that all taxpayers incur the same fluctuation penalty. Some individuals may expe-
rience fairly gradual movement from no income to a substantial income. An automobile
mechanic may enter the labor force as a trainee at about the minimum wage, and steadily but
modestly increase his earnings as his skill increases with experience. Such an individual's fluctua-
tion penalty between the ages of 18 and 30 will be small relative to that of an individual who has
little or no income during four years of college and three years of law school, and then takes a job
as an associate in a New York City law firm.
The inequity of denying averaging to both the mechanic and law-firm associate during the
first four years of their self-support could be more easily defended if it did indeed result in admin-
istrative savings, as does the disallowance of commuting expense deductions. The net administra-
tive savings may be modest, however, because the support test is itself complex and difficult to
administer. There has been a substantial amount of litigation and ruling activity over the basic
support test itself. See, e.g., Sharvy v. Commissioner, 566 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1977); Jolitz v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 732 (1980); Dykstra v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 890 (1982); Wyche
v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 926 (1979) (cases dealing with the issue of whether the tax-
payer had provided at least one-half of his support during the years over which he averaged his
income). See also infra note 83 and accompanying text for a discussion of administrability.
58. There are about as many lists of criteria as there have been tax policy commentators. See,
e.g., R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 235 (3d ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE]; J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (4th
ed. 1983); Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567 (1965).
59. The "stabilization" and "growth" criteria may seem at first to be contradictory. How-
ever, the stabilization criterion reflects a bias against irregularity, not a bias against steady growth.
60. Pechman compresses this list into three compound factors. J. PECHMAN, supra note 58, at
5. Musgrave and Musgrave use this list, but split administrability into a fairness component and a
cost component, while combining stabilization and growth into a single factor. MUsoRAvE &
MUSGRAVE, supra note 58, at 235. Sneed's criteria have a spaciousness of presentation that makes
it difficult to compare them with any list that uses single words or short phrases to describe each
criterion. See Sneed, supra note 58, at 567. Nevertheless, I think his goals substantially corre-
spond to those in the text.
Some commentators use other standards to appraise a tax as well, but the additional factors
generally may be considered derivative from the six goals listed. The goal of making the tax
"understandable to the taxpayer," MusORAvE & MUSoRAvE, supra note 58, at 235, could be de-
rived from the fairness and administrability criteria. The goal of designing a tax to reduce inequi-
ties, H. GROVES, PosT WAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS, 373-74 (1946), is more
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Although they are usually set out as criteria for evaluating a
"tax"-for example, the federal income tax-they can be used as well
to evaluate the degree to which any part of an overall tax structure aids
or impedes achievement of those objectives. Care must be taken when
this is done, however, because the soundness of the overall tax is not a
simple sum of the strengths and weaknesses of each part, weighed sepa-
rately under each criterion. An unfavorable feature of one part of a tax
system may be in such perfect equipoise with some other part of the
system as to produce a result that is more favorable overall than any
system incorporating improvements to the feature. 6' This is nothing
but another application of the familiar "second-best" paradox.62
It appears, however, that income averaging poses no serious sec-
ond-best problems. It further appears that income averaging has rela-
tively little impact on the achievement of most of the standard tax-
policy goals. Rather, income averaging must rise or fall almost entirely
on the basis of how well it satisfies the goal of fairness. The first part of
this section will provide a brief analysis of income averaging in terms
of what may be called the "pragmatic ' 63 criteria: efficiency, adminis-
trability, stabilization, growth, and revenue-raising, in order to show
that achievement of these goals is little affected by the presence or ab-
sence of income averaging. Indeed, if anything, this analysis suggests
that the few discernible effects of averaging are more likely to be unfa-
vorable than favorable.
After discussing those elements of policy analysis that appear to be
less central to a discussion of income averaging, the second part of this
problematic. If one's notions of fairness include reduction of inequality, then the six factors in the
text subsume this factor; if one does not believe that inequality is unfair, one is likely to reject
reduction of inequality as a criterion of a sound tax. In either event, the six-factor list in the text is
not incomplete.
61. See, e.g., Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HARV. L. REv. 925, 984 (1967) (continued exclusion of unemployment compensation and social
security benefits may equalize tax burden if gifts, bequests, and imputed income from personal
property are also excluded).
62. See Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11
(1956). As applied to the federal income tax, the second-best paradox would suggest that if some
departures from the "best" tax system are necessary for administrative or other reasons, the next-
best tax system may not be the one whose individual features most closely resemble the features of
the best system. Rather, the second-best system may include some features that depart considera-
bly from their counterparts in an ideal system, but are balanced with other features in such a way
that the overall burden distribution of the second-best tax resembles the burden distribution of the
ideal tax more closely than any alternative tax systems, including those whose individual features
seem more appealing. See Bittker, supra note 61, at 984.
63. The term "pragmatic" is used here mostly as a matter of convenience to distinguish fair-
ness concerns from all other tax policy goals. The term seems reasonably apt: A perfect tax
system would be one that was, above all, perfectly fair; deviations from perfect fairness reflect
primarily considerations of practicality, or if you will, pragmatism.
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section considers averaging in light of the fairness criterion. This part
concludes that the unfairness of a tax system without averaging is exag-
gerated, and that what little unfairness exists is only sporadically re-
lieved by income averaging. As a consequence, the case for outright
repeal, or at least drastic curtailment, of averaging seems strong indeed.
B. The "Pragmatic" Tax Policy Criteria.
1. Efficiency. A tax system's impact on the efficiency of private
markets is almost invariably a negative one.64 The underlying assump-
tion is that markets are efficient in allocating goods and services to their
highest and best uses, and that the tax system, by altering the parame-
ters of the decisions made by firms and households, introduces distor-
tions from the most efficient allocation of resources.65 The efficiency
goal, then, is to minimize the nearly inevitable distortions caused by the
tax; efficiency is produced passively-in fact, it is not so muchproduced
as it is permitted by a good tax.66
Efficiency concerns do not seem to be heavily implicated in the
income averaging issue. Admittedly, one can imagine that the specter
of a fluctuation penalty may affect some small number of taxpayer de-
cisions. The general form of decisions that may be affected by a fluctu-
ation penalty would involve choices between an economic activity that
produces a steady income stream and an alternative activity that pro-
duces an income stream of larger present value, but of lesser regularity.
The latter activity would presumably be chosen in a tax-free world,
67
but may not be chosen if the irregular income stream is burdened by a
fluctuation penalty that is greater than the difference in present value
between the two income streams. Thus, it would not be unreasonable
to suppose that fluctuation penalties might make people somewhat less
willing, for example, to buy lottery tickets or to embark on careers as
novelists.
64. It is theoretically possible to design a tax that is highly efficient by choosing a base that is
wholly unconnected to any particular economic activity. A head tax assessed against all citizens
would be an example. The defects of a head tax are obvious, however, and once the tax system
selects income, consumption, land, or whatever, as a base, it begins to distort economic decisions.
65. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 58, at 303-17.
66. Some public finance theorists consider the minimization of administrative and compli-
ance costs to be also an aspect of the efficiency of a tax, but it seems more natural to evaluate those
under the administrability criterion. Musgrave and Musgrave employ this latter approach. Id. at
302-03.
67. For this to be true as a general matter, it must also be assumed that credit markets are
efficient, so that the taxpayer's consumption pattern is not impinged by the irregularity of his
income under the latter option. It should be further assumed that the individual choosing among
alternative income streams is risk-neutral, because it seems likely that the regularity of an income
flow is associated with the certainty of that flow.
[Vol. 1984:509
Vol. 1984:509] INCOME AVERAGING
Facilitation of lotteries and gambling has, of course, never been
the policy of the federal government. Permitting novelists to flourish
comports better with public policy, but anecdotal evidence suggests
that large numbers of young adults are entirely prepared to make sub-
stantial sacrifices to pursue careers in writing, dancing, singing, paint-
ing, professional sports, and other activities characterized by
fluctuating incomes. 68 It seems very doubtful that the existence of a
fluctuation penalty would much impede this zeal; nor does it appear
that supporters of averaging have placed any significant reliance on the
argument that fluctuation penalties misallocate resources away from
activities of the sort listed above.69
A somewhat more serious allocational issue is raised by the possi-
bility that fluctuation penalties may discourage risk-taking generally.
It is likely that uncertainty in the flow of income is correlated with
irregularity in the flow of income; acceptance of uncertainty in the flow
of income is a definitional characteristic of risk-taking, which is an es-
sential part of economic innovation. 70 By this string of connections,
68. My evidence may be anecdotal, but the anecdotes are very widespread: Opera singers,
athletes, and the like are frequently cited as examples of professions in which the supply of labor
is quite inelastic. When labor supply is inelastic, tax burdens create less distortion. See, e.g.,
MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 58, at 322 (which suggests that imposing heavier taxes on
opera stars than on other workers may be relatively efficient, by reason of the opera stars' pre-
sumed inelasticity of labor supply).
69. It is possible to find glimmerings of an allocational argument in some of the materials
prepared prior to the 1964 enactment of general income averaging, but I am not aware of any fully
developed argument to this effect. An example that comes as close as any to an allocational
argument is the following excerpt from Becker, An Averaging Proposal, in TAX REVISION COM-
PENDIUM, supra note 6, at 675, 677:
The fact that [averaging] would materially aid a great segment of those in artistic pur-
suits calls to mind an important corollary benefit to be derived. I refer to the growing
realization that our Government can no longer afford the luxury of ignoring the welfare
of America's creators of culture. . . . [There remains the crying need for realistic ac-
tion to make a life devoted to the arts more appealing and rewarding. . . . In this vast
competition between cultures we cannot overlook any means which will aid the continu-
ing growth in quantity and quality of America's artistic endeavors.
In particular, the suggestion that the quantity of artistic endeavors would be affected by averaging
is an allocational argument, albeit an informal and unsupported one. Because the extent of misal-
location caused by a tax is directly related to the elasticity of the burdened commodity, see Mus-
GRAVE & MUSGRAVE, note 58, at 305-06, it can be inferred that the misallocation that would be
caused by fluctuation penalites would be modest.
70. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 621-23 (10th ed. 1976); see generally, W. BLUM & H.
KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1970); F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCER-
TAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). The debate over the effects of progressive taxes generally on willing-
ness to take risks has broken out again recently in the pages of the National Tax Journal.
Fellingham and Wolfson have modeled the traditional position that progressive taxes will induce
risk-neutral taxpayers to accept less risk. See Fellingham & Wolfson, The Effects of Alternative
Income Tax Structures on Risk-Takingin Capital Markets, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 339 (1978). Schneider
replied with a model suggesting that risk-neutral taxpayers could, under some circumstances, re-
main neutral even under a progressive tax. See Schneider, The Effects ofProgressive and Propor-
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penalties imposed on irregular income flows could arguably depress
innovation.
The possibility that this may be so cannot be conclusively rejected.
It should be remembered, however, that too much risk-taking is as un-
desirable as too little; again, the efficiency criterion calls for as little
interference with the market as possible. There are several features of
the federal income tax, in addition to averaging, that limit the problem
of fluctuation penalties, and at least a few provisions that explicitly en-
courage risk-taking.
It should also be noted that the concern here is with business risk-
taking, and about three-quarters of American business activity, as mea-
sured by its contribution to national income, is undertaken by corpora-
tions.7' Although there is some graduation in the corporate tax rates at
the lowest end,72 the corporate income tax is not intended to operate as
a progressive tax.73 The rates flatten at forty-six percent for annual
corporate income in excess of $100,000; 7 4 the lower rates applying to
the first $100,000 of income are intended merely as a relief measure to
small businesses. 75 Thus, there is little or no fluctuation penalty associ-
ated with variability of corporate income, and, of course, no averaging
device available for what variation there is. Corporations do distribute
tional Income Taxation on Risk-Taking, 33 NAT'L TAX J. 67 (1980). However, the range of
outcomes in Schneider's progressive tax model involve movements within a single marginal tax
bracket. That is, he examines a tax structure in which an income of $20,000 is taxed at an average
rate of 20%, an income of $50,000 is taxed at an average rate of 40%, and an income of $80,000 is
taxed at an average rate of 45%. That structure meets the definitional requirements of a progres-
sive tax, but it can be seen that moving from an income of $20,000 to $50,000 causes a tax increase
of $16,000, or 53.3% of the income gain, and that moving from an income of $50,000 to $80,000
also involves a tax increase of $16,000, and the same rate of 53.3% of the income gain. Thus,
shifting outcomes from the two extremes to the mean involves no fluctuation penalty. Only in this
very special case, it appears, would neutrality be preserved. See also Fellingham & Wolfson,
Progressive Income Taxes and the Demandfor Risky Assets, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 127 (1984).
71. In 1981, about $1.9 trillion of national income originated in business activities, of which
about $1.44 trillion originated in corporate businesses. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1982-83, 423 (Table 700) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, 1982-83].
72. I.R.C. § 1 l(b) (1982) specifies the following tax rates for corporations: 15% for income not
in excess of $25,000; 18% for income between $25,000 and $50,000; 30% for income between
$50,000 and $75,000; 40% for income between $75,000 and $100,000; and 46% for income in excess
of $100,000. These rates apply to corporations generally, but there are exceptions for life insur-
ance companies, real estate investment trusts, mutual funds, and electing small-business corpora-
tions. See I.R.C. §§ 11 (c), 1363(d) (1982).
73. MUSORAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 58, at 420; J. PECHMAN, supra note 58, at 134.
74. I.R.C. § I l(b) (1982). About 84% of all corporate income is exposed to this top rate.
Author's estimate based on data in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1980,
CORPORATE INCOME TAX RETURNS 67 (Table 17, cols. 1, 2) (1981).
75. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 58, at 420-21.
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some of their profits in the form of dividends to individuals, 76 but this
flow is determined by the directors. That flow can be, and typically is,
managed so as to minimize year-to-year fluctuations. 77 Thus, although
income averaging may make some modest contribution to the overall
efficiency of the tax system, both the magnitude and the scope of these
effects appear to be quite limited.
2. Administrability. By its very nature, any averaging device in-
volves multiyear accounting in one form or another. This is inevitably
troublesome in a tax system whose rules are otherwise organized on the
basis of an annual accounting requirement. While the law is quite
clear concerning permissible choices as to filing status, 78 determination
of marital status,7 9 and applicability of any particular rate structure,
80
all these concepts have to be redefined to deal with a multiyear income-
averaging formula.
Despite this rather considerable potential for problems, however,
it must be conceded that the income-averaging mechanism presently in
place does not appear to have imposed significant difficulties of admin-
istration on the tax system. This can best be seen if the administrability
criterion is broken down into its constituent elements. Although there
is some overlap among such elements, a listing nevertheless provides a
76. About $63 billion in corporate profits were distributed to individuals in 1981. This
amount represented about 42% of corporate after-tax profits. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1982-83,
supra note 71, at 423, 425 (Tables 699, 703).
77. Even as to individuals, there are a number of devices available that mitigate the bunching
of business or investment income. The principal example in this regard is the very favorable
treatment of capital gains. Gains on investments in capital assets, see I.R.C. § 1221 (1982), are
not taxed at all until the asset has been sold or exchanged, I.R.C. § 1001(c) (1982), and are taxed at
the latter point at a rate that is typically only 40% as high as the owner's normal marginal rate.
I.R.C. § 1202 (1982) permits a taxpayer to deduct 60% of net gains on capital assets held for more
than one year, which assures that, in the normal case, the tax burden on such gains will be no
higher than 40% of the tax burden on other marginal income items received by the taxpayer.
It should also be noted that Congress has available tools much more powerful than income
averaging to influence the level of risk-taking and innovation in the economy. Special credits for
research and development, see I.R.C. § 44(f) (1982), and a generally favorable treatment of invest-
ments in physical capital, see I.R.C. § 168 (1982), are among the tools that Congress has chosen in
recent years to encourage capital investment. See also Johnson, Tax Shelter Gain: The Mismatch
of Debt and Supply Side Depreciation, 61 TEX. L. REv. 1013 (1983); Warren & Auerbach, Tax
Policy and Equipment Leasing After TEFR.A, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1579 (1983); Warren & Auerbach,
Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752,
1753-58 (1982).
78. I.R.C. § 2(b)(2)-(3) (1982).
79. I.R.C. § 143 (1982); but see Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382, 1387 (4th Cir. 1981)
(sham transaction doctrine may be applied to determine whether purpose of divorce was to escape
taxation at joint rates).
80. I.R.C. § 1 (1982) contains three sets of tables, for tax years beginning in 1982, in 1983,
and after 1983, respectively.
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useful framework for analysis.8' The first element is the direct adminis-
tration costs: the governmental costs of developing, processing, and au-
diting income averaging schedules. The second element involves the
private costs of compliance. The last element is not truly an independ-
ent element, but rather influences the first two; it relates to the com-
plexity and clarity of the legal concepts. A few comments about each
of these will be sufficient to show that the averaging mechanism does
not create serious problems in the area of administrability, although it
has some significant compliance costs.
a. Administration. Administration of income averaging is quite
simple and straightforward from the viewpoint of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) for two principal reasons. First, in the majority of cases
averaging is entirely mechanical. Few characterizations or judgments
of any kind need be made. No business/pleasure, capital/ordinary, or
other fine lines need be drawn. There are a fairly significant number of
computations in income averaging, but these are readily automated.
The second factor making the task of the IRS simple is that the compu-
tation is, in most cases,82 based solely on numbers that have appeared
on the Form 1040. Thus, no additional documentation is required be-
yond that which the taxpayer has otherwise been compelled to provide.
The bulk of averaging schedules require little or no processing or audit-
ing effort on the part of the IRS.
8 3
b. Compliance. The compliance costs of income averaging-the
private costs of data collection and reporting incurred by taxpayers-
are somewhat more problematic. The data collection aspects of the in-
come-averaging task are simpler than they are in many areas of tax
reporting. Compared with the compiling of dozens of receipts for med-
ical expenses, charitable contributions, interest payments, and other de-
81. Musgrave and Musgrave do not list these factors in precisely the way that I have here, but
all of these factors are mentioned in their discussion of administrability. See MUSGRAVE & MUS-
GRAVE, supra note 58, at 235, 302-03.
82. Where marital status has changed, it may be necessary in some cases to segregate the
parties' respective incomes, something which, if joint returns were filed in previous years, may
never have been reflected on any Form 1040. See supra note 55.
83. The audit effort required in nonroutine cases may, of course, be somewhat higher, For
younger taxpayers, verifying that the self-support requirement, I.R.C. § 1303(c) (1982), has been
satisfied may sometimes be troublesome. And, as mentioned in the preceding note, verifying the
separate incomes of averagers whose marital or filing status has changed, see I.R.C. § 1304(c)
(1982), may present some audit problems. Even in these cases, however, the necessary facts are
subject to reasonably good documentation. It would thus appear that even the special cases in the
averaging area present no greater audit difficulties than the normal cases in, for example, the area
of business travel that has substantial personal benefits. On the whole, then, averaging does not
seem particularly difficult for the IRS to administer.
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ductible expenses needed to complete a Schedule A, 84 or the collection
of Form 1099 copies needed to complete Schedule B, 85 the averaging
computation data requirements are slender. One must locate only four
documents: the Form 1040 copies for each of the base years.
86
Though data collection may not be troublesome, using the averag-
ing mechanism is. To taxpayers, the computational framework of the
income averaging form-Schedule G-may be the most magical and
intimidating of any in the federal tax system. On the thirty-two lines of
the schedule,8 7 the taxpayer is called upon to enter or reenter data at no
fewer than twelve points88 and is required to perform a minimum of
twenty-four arithmetic operations with respect to those data entries.89
At the conclusion of this process, the now-dazed taxpayer produces a
84. Schedule A is used to report a taxpayer's itemized deductions, including medical and
dental expenses, deductible taxes, interest paid, charitable contributions, casualty and theft losses,
and miscellaneous deductions, such as professional expenses and investment expenses.
85. Schedule B is used to report a taxpayer's interest and dividend income, and must be filed
if the amount received in either category totals more than $400. See IRS Form 1040, Schedule B;
Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-1(a)(6) (1983). Form 1099 is used by payors of interest and dividends to
report payments of$ 10 or more to individual taxpayers. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6042-29 (1983). Cop-
ies of these forms must be provided to the taxpayers in question. See I.R.C. §§ 6042(c), 6049(c)
(1982).
86. This is true, of course, only where filing status has not changed, and the taxpayer, if
married, remains married to the same spouse throughout the computation period. The data-gath-
ering process can become quite complex if a joint return was filed in one of the base years, and a
separate or single return was filed in the computation year, because income aggregated on such a
joint return will have to be disaggregated for the averaging computation, a process that will usu-
ally require resort to documents other than the Form 1040. Of course, even as to the simple case
where filing status has not changed, it should be recognized that the filing talents of taxpayers vary
widely; one presumes that finding tax return copies for four prior years is very easy for some
households and completely impossible for others. And, though the number of documents needed
is small, the fact that the documents range in age up to four years, and are likely to be stored in
four different places, complicates the data collection. The IRS will provide a taxpayer with copies
of his prior returns, but its response to requests for such data may be tortuously slow, especially
during the period just prior to the April 15 filing deadline when a would-be income averager is
most likely to make such a request. Thus, for taxpayers who need the Service's help in collecting
their data, income averaging will often entail the additional burden of seeking an extension of
filing time, or the filing of an amended return. See I.R.C. § 1304(a) (1982) (allowing a taxpayer to
elect income averaging with respect to a computation year "at any time before the expiration of
the period prescribed for making a claim of refund. . . for the taxable year").
87. The number of lines varies modestly from year to year, depending primarily on what
adjustments must be made to achieve comparability between the base years and the computation
year. The material infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text is based on the 1983 Schedule G.
88. Lines 1, 2,4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 12 require data entry. Lines 17, 20, and 22 call for the reentry
of certain data appearing elsewhere on the schedule.
89. Lines 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 27, 28, and 32 all require some computation.
Lines 24-26 require that tax liabilities be computed for particular amounts of taxable income.
These lines are counted thrice in the total of twenty-four computations because computing a tax
liability requires three arithmetic operations: (1) taxable income less the lower bound of the appli-




number representing his tax liability,90 which is likely to be about six
hundred dollars below what his tax liability would be without averag-
ing.9t The sheer number of data entries and computational operations
makes it highly probable that taxpayers: (a) will make mistakes; (b)
will be intimidated by the averaging schedule; and (c) will have no
sense of the significance of each step in the process.
Of course, these facts, together with the magical savings of several
hundreds of dollars of tax per eligible taxpayer, make income averag-
ing a great boon to the tax return preparation industry. Indeed, that
industry may be the principal beneficiary of the averaging provisions.
Like the IRS, major tax-return preparers handle large numbers of aver-
aging computations each year-presumably enough to wholly or partly
automate the averaging computation model.92 Once the data are en-
tered into an automated process, a completed Schedule G may be only
microseconds away. For all the reasons that the IRS finds averaging
relatively easy to administer, one presumes that the major tax prepara-
tion services find income-averaging preparation handsomely profitable.
Data are not available on the number of Schedule G's which are pre-
pared by professional tax preparers. However, the overall proportion
of return preparation done by professionals is about fifty percent. 93 As-
suming that taxpayers are charged approximately twenty-five dollars
for preparation of a Schedule G,94 it seems reasonable to conclude that
the compliance costs of averaging are well in excess of $100 million per
year.95
90. For 1983, the entry from line 32 of Schedule G was to be entered on line 38 of form 1040,
which is captioned simply: "Tax." An irresistable-although somewhat oversimplified-observa-
tion is that it takes nearly as many lines to undertake income averaging as it does to do all the
other things necessary to compute the tentative tax liability.
91. Individual savings from income averaging averaged $578 in 1981. STATISTICS Or IN-
COME, supra note 10, at 74 (Table 3.1, col. 18).
92. See, e.g., the income-averaging capabilities of the following computer software:
SOFTAX by Design Trends Ltd.; Quick Tax by QuickTax Ltd.; Cal-Q-Tax by Tax Management,
Inc.
93. Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS (Tax Assistance Services and Monitoring
of Commercial Tax Preparers): Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Conn. on Government
Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1975) (statement of Donald Alexander, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue Service).
94. Although many return preparers charge hourly fees, which makes it difficult to estimate
the average cost of Schedule G preparation, at least one preparation service, H & R Block, charges
$25 for a simple Schedule 0, in which marital and filing status have not changed, and all data is
provided by the taxpayer.
95. If half of the 6.6 million averagers in 1981, see supra note 10, spent $25 each on averag-
ing, then over $82 million were spent on averaging schedules prepared by professionals. Because
of the daunting appearance of the Schedule G, it seems reasonable to suppose that more than half
of tax returns which included Schedule G were professionally prepared. Also, some accounting
should be made for the time consumed by those heroic taxpayers who complete their own Sched-
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In fact, the total may be substantially greater, since there may be a
considerable shadow compliance cost. A troublesome fact about the
Schedule G is that a taxpayer must compile all the relevant data, and
must complete twenty of its thirty-two lines, before he can even deter-
mine whether his "averagable income" exceeds the $3000 minimum
necessary to be eligible for income averaging. Further, some taxpayers
who do have more than $3000 of averagable income find that, never-
theless, they save no tax by income averaging. To some degree, intui-
tion may substitute for actual computation, but the opacity of the
averaging computation makes reliance on intuition somewhat treacher-
ous. Presumably, many taxpayers whose incomes have increased mod-
estly do actually complete all or a substantial portion of a Schedule G,
only to conclude that they are ineligible, and that they have wasted
their time.
c. Complexity and clarity of legal concepts. An unfortunately
large number of tax issues at any given time present legal quagmires to
the taxpayers who must deal with them.96 The present income averag-
ing mechanism, however, has few legal ambiguities. There are certain
averaging issues that spawn disputes, and could be improved by fur-
ther-probably congressional--clarification. The "major accomplish-
ment" rule is perhaps the most significant and interesting among
these,97 though questions relating to documentation of the amount of
income in the base-period years have spawned the greatest volume of
litigation,98 largely because taxpayers sometimes have so little income
in their base-period years that they are exempt from filing require-
ments, and are consequently careless about recordkeeping. 99 As a gen-
ule G's. Taking the latter factor into account, the $100 million estimated compliance cost is surely
conservative. Of course, it should also be remembered that the cash costs of professional tax
return preparation (but not the opportunity costs of self-help) are deductible. I.R.C. § 212(3)
(1982). This doesn't reduce the compliance costs, but does shift some of them from private to
public accounts.
96. The debt-equity distinction under I.R.C. § 385 (1982), the includability of fringe benefits
under I.R.C. § 61 (1982), and the status of assets sold in the course of business under I.R.C.
§ 1221(1) (1982) are a few examples that come to mind.
97. See supra note 55.
98. See, e.g., McCaskill v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 689 (1981); Gardner v. Commissioner, 46
T.C.M. (CCH) 1283 (1983); Brenauer v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 784 (1983); Caputo v.
Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 521 (1983); Olive. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1249
(1983); Lynch v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1125 (1983); Bianco v. Commissioner, 43
T.C.M. (CCH) 1039 (1982); Venditti v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 519 (1981); Kannas v.
Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 194 (1980); Hill v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 595 (1979);
Abernathy v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1529 (1978); Ryza v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 269 (1977); Binstein v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 450 (1973).
99. See, e.g., Caputo v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 521 (1983); Hill v. Commissioner,
38 T.C.M. (CCH) 595 (1979); Binstein v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 450 (1973).
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eral matter, however, the income averaging provisions are models of
clarity.
Some evidence that this is the case can be gleaned from examining
the judicial and administrative attention that has been formally paid to
income averaging. Only forty-nine judicial decisions have been ren-
dered on income averaging in its nearly twenty years of existence.' 00
Only thirteen published administrative rulings and seventeen private
letter rulings have been issued with respect to averaging,' 0 and some
of these are not genuine interpretations of the averaging provisions, but
rather present advice that income averaging may be available to miti-
gate an otherwise harsh result.'0 2 Even more remarkable is that there
has not been a revenue ruling issued with respect to the income averag-
ing provisions in nearly a decade.'0 3 Given that these provisions are
used by six million taxpayers per year, 0 4 this paucity of judicial and
administrative decisions suggests that Congress succeeded in designing
a system that is quite well-defin'ed 0 5
3. Macroeconomic Effects. It cannot be seriously maintained
that income averaging significantly affects the overall characteristics of
the income tax with respect to stabilization and growth of the economy.
100. One hesitates to make absolute claims of comprehensiveness as to statistics of this sort.
The assertion, however, that there are only 49 cases is based on a search using the Sid Fed Tax
Rpir., the Fed Taxes Service (P-H), and a Lexis search of all opinions that have used the phrase
"income averaging" or have contained citations to any of the relevant code sections. A list of
these cases is available from the author or from this Journal.
I01. See supra note 100.
102. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-350, 1967-2 C.B. 58 (lump-sum "readjustment payment" to an
armed forces reservist involuntarily released from active duty is includible in income in the year
received, but tax on this income may be computed using income averaging if taxpayer meets
eligibility requirements).
103. The most recent was Rev. Rul. 75-324, 1975-2 C.B. 348 (a taxpayer need not use the same
accounting method during each year of the base period in order to elect income averaging).
104. See supra note 10.
105. It is, of course, difficult to make any very scientific analysis of this data. To prove that
income averaging is exceptional in its freedom from legal ambiguity one would need to compare
the actual volume of cases and rulings with a predicted volume based on some "litigation genera-
tion" model that incorporated such variables as the number of taxpayers affected, the tax liability
at stake per taxpayer, etc. No such model is presently available.
It would be interesting to experiment with such a model. One very crude step in that direc-
tion was undertaken in connection with the research for this article. The rate of "interpretations"
per year for income averaging was compared with the rate of "interpretations" of I.R.C. § 1348
(1982), which, for tax years between 1970 and 1980, capped the marginal tax rates at 50% for
personal-service income. The "maximum tax," as the latter was called, involved fewer taxpayers
and had a lower aggregate tax-dollar effect, although the savings per electing taxpayer was larger.
See 1981 STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 10, at 73-74 (Table 3.1, cols. 17, 18). It is interest-
ing-but no more than merely interesting-to note that the rate of interpretations was about four
times as great for the maximum tax as for income averaging, even though the maximum tax
provisions-like the averaging provisions-seem quite straightforward.
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Averaging has little impact on capital formation, and the revenue im-
pact, although appreciable in absolute terms, 0 6 has never amounted to
as much as .2% of the gross national product (GNP). 10 7 It will suffice at
this point to note that income averaging has one modest effect that is
adverse to the goal of stabilization and, arguably, one modest effect
favoring growth.
a. Stabilization. The well-known stabilization effect of a gradu-
ated tax results from its tendency to produce revenue changes that are
disproportionate to changes in national income.'08 Thus, if national
income increases x percent, income tax collections will increase by
more than x percent.'0 9 This is true simply because the increment re-
ceived by each taxpayer is taxed at his highest marginal rate, which
increases the proportion of his total income that the income tax ac-
counts for," 0 and increases the proportion of national income in the
aggregate that is devoted to taxes."' Similarly, a decline in national
income of x percent would be associated with a revenue loss of greater
than x percent, because the lost income would be taken from each tax-
payer's highest marginal tax bracket. Thus, a graduated tax stabilizes
the economy by withdrawing greater proportional taxes from a growing
economy, possibly preventing "overheating," and a lesser proportion
from a declining economy, possibly aiding in maintaining family bud-
gets at close to the prior levels. This stabilization theory, of course, is
based on the macroeconomic view that consumer demand is the pri-
mary engine of the economy, and that the tax system can be useful in
preventing consumer demand from growing too rapidly or falling too
precipitously. Both premises may be questionable. The stabilization
106. The revenue loss is almost $4 billion per year. See supra note 11.
107. The income-averaging savings of $3,919,414,000, see supra note 11, was slightly more
than .1% of the 1981 GNP for the United States. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1982-83, supra note 71,
at 419 (Table 690).
108. See J. PECHMAN, supra note 58, at 12-13.
109. Pechman estimates that, under the 1981 rate structure, increases or decreases of 10% in
national income would produce increases or decreases, respectively, of individual income tax reve-
nues of 15%. Id at 13.
110. If indexing of rate brackets under I.R.C. § l(f) (1982) is allowed to take effect in 1985, as
the Code presently provides, nominal increases in income might be offset by inflation-induced
changes in the rate structure itself. It will continue to be true, however, even in an indexed system,
that real increases in income will produce a disproportionately greater increase in tax revenue.
11. It may be worth noting that this is an effect that a graduated tax tends to produce, but it is
not a mathematically certain effect. Imagine, for example, an economy of five employed women
earning 2x per year, and one unemployed woman earning nothing. If the unemployed woman
gains employment at an income of x, national income will rise 10% from lOx to lIx. But if
incomes of 2x are taxed at an average rate of 20%, and incomes ofx are taxed at an average rate
of only 10%, then tax collections will rise only 5%, from 2x to 2.Ix.
Vol. 1984:509]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
theory, however, whatever its intrinsic worth, has become firmly en-
trenched in the established lore of tax policy."12
All that need be noted with respect to the role of income averaging
in this stabilization effect is that the presence of averaging somewhat
dulls the tendency of a graduated tax to exaggerate the revenue-expan-
sion and -contraction effects of national income changes. As incomes
increase, taxpayers will have greater parts of their incomes exposed to
higher rates, but it is also true that a significant number of them will be
able to mitigate the effects of those higher rates through averaging.
The converse is true as well:" 3 in a sluggish or declining economy,
fewer taxpayers will be eligible for averaging. Thus, the dampening
effect of graduated rates on consumer demand is itself dampened by
averaging.
b. Growth. The effect of averaging on growth is simple, and
probably very modest. High marginal tax rates are thought to depress
growth for two reasons. First, they encourage those taxpayers who are
exposed to high marginal rates to substitute leisure for labor," 4 because
112. Pechman adopts this view in its simplest form. J. PECHMAN, supra note 58, at 12-13.
Musgrave and Musgrave present a more sophisticated analysis, but do not seem to question the
basic effect. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 58, at 616-18.
113. Readers of earlier drafts of this article have found the "converse" effect of income aver-
aging referred to in the text-that is, the tendency of averaging to reduce the dampening effect of a
progressive tax in a period of declining national income-to be far from self-evident, perhaps
because averaging itself is asymmetrical, lacking as it does a downward averaging device. In fact,
the dampening effect referred to is partly the result of this asymmetry, because the absence of
downward averaging provisions makes it nearly certain that taxpayers in the aggregate will have
fewer dollars of tax savings from averaging in periods of income decline than during periods of
growth or normalcy. In contrast, if tax savings from § averaging were tied to income fluctuations,
positive or negative, tax savings from averaging would presumably be high in periods of either
growth or decline, and low in periods of stability. These observations, and the general dampening
effect explained in the text, can be illustrated by the following example. Assume that the economy
in period 1 consists of taxpayers with incomes of $200, and that the rate structure imposes a tax of
10% on the first $100 and 30% on the excess above $100. The tax collected will then be $40 per
taxpayer ((.1 X 100) + (.3 X 100)). If income declines in period 2 by 10%, to $180, tax liability will
decline by 15% to $34 ((.1 x 100) + (.3 X 80)). This dampens the effect of a recession on disposa-
ble income, because after-tax income has declined from $160 to $146, only an 8.75% decline, even
though pretax income declined a full 10%. This illustrates the basic cushioning effect of a progres-
sive tax in a declining economy. But suppose that income averaging in period 1 had saved each
taxpayer a mean amount of $2, but in period 2, because recession years are less likely to produce
the income growth needed to use averaging, the mean savings per taxpayer from income averag-
ing is only $1. This means that tax collections in the two periods would be $38 and $33 per
taxpayer, respectively, and that aftertax income would decline from $162 to $147. In percentage
terms, this decline is 9.26%--which is between the pretax decline of 10% and the 8.75% that the tax
system would have produced without any averaging provisions. Thus, the dampening effect of
progressive tax structures is itself dampened by averaging.
114. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 58, at 306. Economists note that there are both
substitution effects and income effects involved in this analysis. High rates of tax on labor income
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the latter is highly taxed and the former is untaxed. Additionally, high
marginal rates also encourage investors exposed to those rates to seek
tax-favored investments, which may have small, or even negative, real
pretax rates of return. 115 The effect of a tax system on economic
growth is thus closely linked to the efficiency of that tax system; only by
minimizing the distortion of taxpayer choices among investments and
between labor and leisure can a tax system achieve maximum growth.
Averaging operates to mitigate high marginal rates. It does not, of
course, affect all or even most taxpayers in any given year, but averag-
ing operates unambiguously to reduce marginal rates of those taxpay-
ers who are affected, reducing the distortion of their labor/leisure and
investment choices.
4. Revenue. The revenue effects of income averaging are also
unambiguous. In 1981, the most recent year for which data are avail-
able, taxpayers saved just under four billion dollars by income averag-
ing." 6 It may put this figure in some perspective to note that the entire
estate and gift tax revenues during the same year were estimated to be
about 6.8 billion dollars. 17 The revenue loss caused by the presence of
the averaging provisions has grown steadily in the years since these
provisions were added to the Code, as shown by Table II. The growth
in real revenue loss can be best measured by reference to column 4,
which presents the revenue loss in 1981 dollars." 8
tend to induce a substitution of leisure for labor; but high rates of tax on labor also reduce dispos-
able income, which may reduce the taxpayer's demand for leisure. Of the two, however, the sub-
stitution effect is thought to be the stronger. See Hausman, Labor Supply, in How TAXES AFFECT
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 27, 61-63 (1981).
115. J. PECHMAN, supra note 58, at 74.
116. .Seesupra note 11.
117. UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT, COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS, Ex-
PENDITURES, AND BALANCES 10 (1982).
118. Column 4 is produced by multiplying column 3 by the ratio of the mean consumer price
index for the year to the mean 1981 consumer price index. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1982-83,




Percent of All Returns Revenue Revenue Loss,
Year Filing Schedule G Loss (millions) 1981 dollars (millions)
1964 .38 $133 $390
1965 .45 171 430
1966 .54 210 589
1967 .74 253 689
1968 .72 291 761
1969 .78 294 729
1970 1.35 536 1255
1971 1.60 681 1529
1972 1.78 897 1950
1973 2.69 1418 2902
1974 3.29 1710 3160
1975 3.42 1413 2387
1976 4.24 1733 2769
1977 4.01 1895 2844
1978 4.96 2545 3548
1979 4.95 2977 3730
1980 6.07 3550 3918
1981 6.86 3781 3781
The nearly ten-fold growth in real revenue loss since averaging
was added to the Code can be explained in substantial part by rising
inflation.' 19 Accelerating inflation has made more taxpayers eligible to
average. The averaging formula does not, of course, distinguish be-
tween real and nominal growth in taxable income; it is based simply on
a comparison of nominal income in the computation year with thirty
percent of the nominal income received in the base period.120 Because
the base-period data are, on average, two and a half years older than
the computation-year data, it follows that inflation alone, with no real
fluctuation in income whatever, can make a taxpayer eligible for aver-
aging if the rate of inflation is high enough to open a sufficient spread
119. Another factor contributing to the increase of revenue loss is the greater familiarity of
taxpayers with averaging which has developed over time. The averaging schedule appears quite
complicated. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. This was particularly true before the
simplifications of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See supra note 9. Also, it is an optional schedule,
so it presents a complexity that taxpayers are not obligated to deal with if they choose not to. In
any case, it is clear that, at least in the early years of the averaging provisions, a considerable
number of eligible taxpayers did not exercise the option to use income averaging, even though
they would surely have lowered their tax liability by doing so. See Steurele, supra note 24, at 22
(estimate that only 3 1.1% of all eligible taxpayers elected to use income averaging in 1971). It is
possible that the greater tendency of taxpayers to use tax return preparation services, and the
promotional efforts undertaken by those services, have increased public awareness of income aver-
aging, and have increased the proportion of eligible taxpayers who elect to average.
120. I.R.C. § 1302(b) (1982).
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between base-period income and computation-year income. Further,
the greater the contribution of inflation to income growth, the less real
growth in income is required to make a taxpayer eligible for averaging.
The introduction of income averaging roughly coincided with the
beginning of a period of more or less continuously growing rates of
inflation. Figure 1 shows the year-to-year consumer price index rate of
change during the 1964-1981 period. Although the rate ebbs and flows,
the trend is clear. More relevant for income-averaging purposes are the
composite rates of inflation over five-year spans. Figure 2 graphs such
composite rates, with the vertical coordinate for each year representing
the percentage growth of that year's mean consumer price index over
the mean consumer price index in the fourth preceding year. Thus,
each vertical coordinate represents the inflation that took place be-
tween the first base-period year and that computation year. The four-
year composite rates smooth out the year-to-year differences and re-
solve any doubt that inflation has been not simply a continuing prob-
lem, but an accelerating problem over the last two decades.
The impact of inflation on eligibility for averaging can be demon-
strated in two ways: in the aggregate, by looking at the relationship
between the proportion of taxpayers who elect averaging and the
compound inflation rate for the preceding four years, and in particular,
by examining the averaging formula itself for its sensitivity to inflation-
ary pressures. Figure 2 presents the first demonstration. It shows that
the curve representing the proportion of taxpayers electing averaging is
remarkably closely linked to the composite inflation rate during the rel-
evant five-year averaging period. In fact, the coefficient of correlation
between the two variables is .966.
This phenomenon can also be demonstrated on a disaggregated
basis, for some particular income levels. With modest manipulation,
the averaging provisions yield a formula that can relate a particular
rate of income growth to an income level sufficient to make a taxpayer
eligible for averaging. If income in the first base-period year is YB.,,
then the computation-year income may be represented as YBI (1 +r1 )
(l+r2 ) (l+r3 ) (l+r4), where r1 through r4 are the rates of income
growth from each year to the next year within the five-year averaging
period. This computation-year income figure must be, if the taxpayer
is to be eligible for averaging, more than $3000 greater than thirty per-
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computation-year income, we can represent total base-period income
as:
Y8Bi + YB(I+rl)+ Y,(l+rl) (1+r2)+ YB,(l+r,) (l+r 2 ) (l+r). Rather
than using hypothetical rates for the values of r, through r4 , it is in-
structive to use the actual inflation rates that have, in large part, ac-
counted for the fact that income averaging saved taxpayers almost four
billion dollars in 1981.121 Specifically, we can use the inflation rates
from 1977-1981 to see at what income level inflation alone would have
made a taxpayer eligible for averaging.1 22 Using 7.7% for r, (inflation
from 1977-1978), 11.3% forr2 ('78-'79), 13.5% for r3 ('79-'80) and 10.4%
forr4 ('80-'81), we can solve for YB1. Doing so, we find that a taxpayer
with as little as $27,027 of income in 1977 would be eligible for income
averaging in 1981 if his income increased in each year within the in-
come period by precisely the amount necessary to keep his real income
constant. 123 Furthermore, if even modest real growth in income is pre-
sumed, averaging becomes routinely available at even lower income
levels. For example, if three percent real growth is added to the 1977-
1981 inflationary growth noted above, a person with an income of only
$13,089 in 1977 would have enough income growth by 1981 to be eligi-
ble for averaging in that year. And it should be noted that real growth
rates in this range are not at all unusual in certain age groups, even in
periods of little overall economic growth. Workers in their forties typi-
cally earn more than workers in their thirties, and the latter typically
earn more than workers in their twenties. 124 For the average taxpayer,
simply staying in the workforce during those decades of his life is likely
to be enough to create earnings growth that, coupled with the inflation
rates of recent years, will make him eligible for averaging. 125
Whether the growth in revenue loss from averaging will continue
in the future is difficult to predict, but it is possible to identify a pair of
factors that may help staunch the outflow, and a pair that will aggra-
vate it. First, the last two years have witnessed the most significant
abatement in the inflation rate in the last decade. This abatement can
121. See supra note 10.
122. The inflation rates relate each year's mean consumer price index with the mean index for
the preceding year. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1982-83, supra note 71, at 453 (Table 745).
123. It may be well to remind the reader at this point why the absolute level of the starting
point-income in the first base-period year-is as important as the rate of growth in determining
eligibility. The threshold amount of averagable income that must be exceeded for averaging eligi-
bility is a fixed dollar sum: $3000. That threshold is easier to achieve if the particular growth rate
is applied to a larger base. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
124. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1982-83, supra note 71, at 438 (Table 724).
125. In 1980, for example, male full-time workers aged 25 to 34 earned on the average 81.7%
more than such workers aged 20 to 24. This would suggest an annual growth rate of about 8.2%
between ages 22 and 29 . Id.
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be expected to have a significant negative impact on the number of
taxpayers eligible for averaging over the next few years. Whether these
relatively low rates of inflation can be sustained, of course, remains to
be seen.
Another factor worth noting is that the averaging data available
from the IRS126 have not yet reflected the effect of the 1981 reduction,
effective in 1982 and subsequent years, of the maximum marginal tax
rate from seventy to fifty percent. 127 This change is likely to make
averaging less attractive to some upper-bracket taxpayers; many of
them have, in 1981 and prior years, benefited from the income-averag-
ing effect of shifting income out of the seventy percent bracket. 2 8 The
truncating of tax brackets beginning in 1982 makes this shift auto-
matic-no averaging is needed. And the rate spread at the top end is
now much narrower. 29
On the other hand, the lowering of the top marginal rate was ac-
companied by the repeal of the maximum tax provisions, 130 which dif-
ferentiated between the top marginal rate that applied to "personal
service income" and the top marginal rate that applied to other income.
Since income averaging and the maximum tax computations were both
elective, 131 and were mutually exclusive, 32 it can be predicted that
some taxpayers who did not elect income averaging in 1981 and earlier
years because an election under the maximum tax precluded averaging
will now elect to average. Because more than half a million taxpayers
126. 1981 STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 10.
127. See Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101(c), 95 Stat. 172, 183
(repealing I.R.C. § 1348 (1976)).
128. See infra notes 189-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of vertical equity.
129. Under the 1984 rates, for example, taxable incomes, on a joint return, between $100,000
and $200,000 are exposed to a very narrow set of marginal rates: 45% from $100,000 to $109,400,
49% from $109,400 to $162,400, and 50% for incomes above $162,400. I.R.C. § l(a)(3) (1982).
Thus, there simply is not as much to be gained by using averaging to shift income from high years
within this range to relatively low years. Shifting $25,000 from a year with taxable income of
$200,000 to a year with taxable income of only $100,000 would reduce tax by $626 or less. In
contrast, under the 1980 rates, the $100,000 to $109,400 income slice was taxed at 59%, the
$109,400 to $162,400 slice was taxed at 64%, and the $162,400 to $215,400 slice was taxed at 68%,
I.R.C. § l(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Shifting $25,000 from a $200,000 year to a $100,000 year under this
rate structure could save up to $1470. Note that this is the "fluctuation penalty." How much of
this penalty is relieved by averaging depends on circumstances not detailed in this hypothetical
example.
130. I.R.C. § 1348 (1976), repealed by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 101(c), 95 Stat. 172, 183.
131. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
132. I.R.C. § 1304(b) (1976) amended by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
34, 95 Stat. 172, 183.
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used the maximum tax in 1981,133 and because they tended to be tax-
payers who are in income brackets that make heavy use of averag-
ing, 34 this group may be a significant source of new averagers in the
years after 1981.
Demographic factors will also operate to encourage averaging for
at least the next decade. Age-specific earnings data suggest that full-
time workers experience considerable income growth while in their
twenties and thirties, with only modest gains, if any, thereafter. 35
Since the baby boom peaked in 1957 and did not significantly subside
until 1965,136 the proportion of workers in the workforce who are in
high-growth phases of their careers is likely to continue to increase un-
til the middle-to-late 1990's.
Without a computer model, and perhaps even with one, the resul-
tant vector of these countervailing trends cannot be determined with
any confidence. I offer the following intuitive guesses: (1) the abate-
ment of inflation is unreliable, since much or most of that abatement
has been the product of the 1980-1982 recession; inflation projections
are now swinging back up,' 37 and inflation seems likely again to pro-
vide significant impetus for averaging; (2) the demographic trend is a
significant one-there will be about 10.9% more workers aged twenty to
thirty-nine in 1990 than there were in 1980;138 (3) the truncating of
133. An estimated total of 544,920 taxpayers filed maximum tax computations in 1981. 1981
STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 10, at 72 (Table 3.1, col. 1).
134. Of the 544,920 taxpayers who used the maximum tax provisions in 1981, 453,325 had
adjusted gross incomes between $50,000 and $200,000. Id Over one-third of the taxpayers in
those income brackets used income averaging in 1981. Id See also supra note 103.
135. See supra note 124.
136. HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, 49 (1975)
(Series B: Live Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Divorces: 1909 to 1970). Approximately 4,308,000
live births were recorded in 1957. The number of live births each year through 1964 continued to
be in excess of four million. In 1965, the number of live births declined to about 3,760,000, from
which level the rate generally continued to decline modestly for the balance of the decade. Id.
137. Predicting inflation rates is not something that can be done with any real confidence. As
this article goes to press, however, many economic analysts believe that the rate of inflation by the
end of 1984 is likely to be in the 7-to-8% range. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1984, at 1, col. 6. At
least one Nobel-laureate economist has predicted that the rate will reach 9% by year end. See
Guzzard, The Dire Warnings ofMilton Friedman, FORTUNE, Mar. 19, 1984 at 28. This represents a
sizable increase over the 1983 inflation rate of 3.8%. Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
138. U.S. CENSUS, 1980, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 1-26 (1983) (Table 42).
The Census reveals that, as of the Spring of 1980, the ten-year cohort of persons in their teens
numbered about 39 million; the cohort in their twenties numbered about 41 million; the cohort in
their thirties numbered about 32 million. By 1990, the first cohort will have replaced the last
cohort in the income-growth years of 20-39, resulting in the 10.9% increase noted in the text.
Mortality in these age groups is very low; in fact, it appears to be more than offset by immigration.
Id.
One perplexing finding of the Steurele study, supra note 24, should be noted in this context.
They found that the median age of income averagers was 46 in the tax years between 1967-1971.
[Vol. 1984:509
INCOME A VER.A GING
brackets will reduce revenue loss at the top end of the income distribu-
tion, and somewhat lessen the vertical equity problem posed by averag-
ing; but, (4) the truncating of brackets will be largely offset by the
impetus to average provided by the repeal of the maximum tax provi-
sions. The conclusion must be that the revenue loss from income aver-
aging is likely to increase modestly, absent any legislative change, over
the next several years.
5. Summary. An analysis of the "pragmatic" tax policy criteria
is of some significance. If the more crucial "equitable" criterion is
closely balanced, and the "pragmatic" criteria are overwhelmingly pos-
itive or negative, the overall judgment of the tax feature must be made
largely on the basis of the "pragmatic" criteria.
As to income averaging, however, the foregoing analysis of the
"pragmatic" factors has served primarily to focus attention on the im-
portance of the "equitable" factors because of the balance within and
among the "pragmatic" factors. Averaging appears to nudge the tax
system modestly in the direction of efficiency. Though it has some gen-
uinely difficult problems of complexity, and presents a demoralizing
appearance of complexity to taxpayers, it is nevertheless fairly free of
legal ambiguity, and subject to fairly mechanical and inexpensive ad-
ministration. It has moderate tendencies to dilute the stabilizing influ-
ence of the graduated rate structure. Finally, at a revenue cost of four
billion dollars per year-an amount which, absent congressional
changes to the system, seems unlikely to shrink in the near future-it is
expensive, but not prohibitively so. If that four billion dollars buys
substantial improvement in the equity of the system, it may not be too
high a price to pay. If, conversely, it results in relatively little improve-
ment in equity, a four billion dollar revenue loss looms large. The next
section examines the equity issue in detail.
Id at 21. This seems odd in light of the fact that income growth is more pronounced in younger
age-groups. To some degree, the high median age reflects the fact that during those years, older
taxpayers who were eligible had a much greater propensity to elect averaging. Id at 22. With the
overall increase in the use of averaging, this age-group differential is probably much smaller to-
day. Of course, Steurele's data also reflect the impact of the self-support requirement on the
eligibility of many younger taxpayers, see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text, and perhaps
also the age-differential effect of the $3000 minimum averagable income. See supra notes 51-54
and accompanying text. These latter influences will presumably continue to disqualify from aver-
aging many younger taxpayers who have experienced fluctuation penalties.
However, even if it continues to be true, as it was in Steurele's study, that use of averaging, by
age group, peaks in the forties age-bracket, there is still a demographic basis to predict that use of
averaging will increase. In 1980, there were fewer than 23 million individuals in their forties in
the U.S., reflecting low depression-era birth rates. U.S. CENSUS, 1980, GENERAL POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS 1-26 (1983) (Table 42). By 1990, the number of persons in their forties will
have risen to nearly 32 million, a 38.5% increase. Id.
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B. The Equitable Criterion.
The fairness of a tax system involves two quite distinct elements.
First, the system should avoid making arbitrary distinctions among
more or less equally situated individuals; the system should not burden
some individuals significantly more than others on the basis of trivial
differences in economic status. 39 Second, the system should distribute
the overall burden fairly, but not necessarily evenly, among groups of
taxpayers whose receipt of governmental benefits, and ability to bear
tax burdens, may differ widely.140 The two concepts are generally re-
ferred to as horizontal equity and vertical equity, respectively.
The primary motivation for adding the income averaging provi-
sions to the federal tax code was to improve the horizontal equity of the
system.' 4 ' It was thought to be unfair to burden equal multiyear in-
comes differently merely because some were received in relatively even
annual amounts while others were received erratically. 42 The follow-
ing subsection evaluates income averaging in terms of several different
aspects of the horizontal equity problem.
1. Horizontal Equityi--The Timing Dilemma. It was noted ear-
lier that fluctuating incomes pose a horizontal equity problem in a tax
system that has both a progressive rate structure and an annual ac-
counting requirement.143 This statement of the problem reflects the
conventional view that taxpayers with fluctuating incomes are "penal-
ized" by having their high-income years exposed to high tax rates, and
invites proposals to diminish or eliminate the "fluctuation penalty.
'144
In fact, this conventional view subtly prejudices the policy prescription
by ignoring the double-edged nature of the inequity created by fluctu-
ating incomes. Fluctuating incomes do pose a problem, but it is a
problem in the form of a dilemma.
The nature of the dilemma can be seen by examining the initial
example in this article, 14 which compares the tax treatment of two tax-
payers with lifetime incomes of 50x. One receives that income in equal
139. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 58, at 235.
140. See id at 238.
141. The legislative history of income averaging is bare of any statements that would support
the notion that income averaging was intended to shift burdens among income groups.
142. "Income averaging, in your committee's view, should be designed to treat everyone as
nearly equally for tax purposes as possible, without regard to how their income is spread over a
period of years and without regard to the income involved." H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 110, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1313, 1419.
143. See supra note I and accompanying text.
144. See J. PECHMAN, supra note 58, at 121.
145. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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annual amounts of x, while the other receives an income of 2x in some
years, and an income of zero in other years. The individual with the
fluctuating income will, over the course of her lifetime, pay more tax
than the person with the steady income, unless some provision is added
to the tax structure to relieve the fluctuation penalty. If such a provi-
sion is added to a tax code, however, a new horizontal inequity is cre-
ated. Under virtually all workable averaging devices-including the
one presently in use in the United States-the fluctuation relief takes
the form of reducing the tax liability of this fluctuating taxpayer, in the
years in which her income is 2x, to an amount significantly below the
tax paid by other taxpayers who have incomes of 2x in that year. Thus,
movement toward horizontal equity between two taxpayers of equal
ifetime incomes makes the system less horizontally equitable for pairs
of taxpayers with the same annual incomes.
Definitions of horizontal equity are typically vague concerning the
period over which it is to be gauged. The principle is simply that "sim-
ilarly situated people should be treated similarly, that equals should be
treated equally."' 46 At least one commentator, Judge Sneed, has at-
tempted to add rigor to the definition by including a time dimension:
"The [horizontal equity] criterion asserts that those whose consumption
and net accretion of wealth during a given period are equal [should be
treated equa"y. ' 147 Judge Sneed's purpose in this statement was to
engraft the conceptual soundness and widespread acceptance of the
Haig-Simons accretion definition of income1 48 onto an otherwise
spongy horizontal equity criterion. He no doubt did not intend to ex-
press a view on the desirability or necessity of income averaging. Nev-
ertheless, there is virtually universal recognition of the general
suitability of the annual accounting period for income measure-
ments, 49 and under Sneed's definition, the horizontal equity criterion
would therefore be best satisfied by a system that does not permit
averaging.
Those tax commentators who have focused explicitly on income-
fluctuation problems have held, as a group, the opposite view. Ex-
pressly or implicitly, they believe that horizontal equity must be evalu-
ated in terms of lifetime or multiyear incomes, not annual income.
50
Despite the popularity of the lifetime or multiyear view, however, there
146. W. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (1976).
147. Sneed, supra note 58, at 579 (emphasis added).
148. See H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
149. See, e.g., Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
150. See, e.g., Ferguson & Hood, Income Averaging, 24 TAX L. REv. 53, 53 (1968); Smith,
How to Become Miss America Without Achieving Any 'Major Accomplishment -- Some Thoughts on
Income Averaging Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 329, 330 (1971).
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are powerful arguments for the annual view. This is particularly the
case in situations where the taxpayer does not anticipate the change in
income. To illustrate, imagine a taxpayer A who is a likely candidate
for averaging under the present system. In 1983, as in at least a few
prior years, A is a minor league baseball player, earning an income of
x. In 1984, A finally makes it to the major leagues, and is passably
successful. His salary increases to 3x. A will surely bear a substantial
fluctuation penalty. The conventional tax policy view is that this
should be relieved somehow, that A should pay no more tax than a
taxpayer whose income in both 1983 and 1984 was 2x. To accept this
approach, however, is to impose quite an artificial view on A's percep-
tions, behavior and lifestyle; it is very likely that in neither year did A
live in the manner of a taxpayer with an income of 2x. In 1983, he lived
like a taxpayer with an income of x. X was the appropriate measure of
his ability to pay in that year. In 1984, he had an income of 3x, pre-
sumably lived in a manner similar to others who enjoy that income,
and probably had an ability to pay tax that is appropriately measured
by that income. While it is true that A had a two-year income that is
equal to that of a taxpayer with an income of 2x in each year, the latter
is nevertheless a false paradigm for purposes of determining A's ability
to bear tax burdens. A should be taxed for what he is: a taxpayer with
an income of x in 1983 and a taxpayer with an income of 3x in 1984.
A brief examination of the reasons for a progressive income tax
structure clarifies the underlying perceptions which inform and support
this argument. This is, of course, a subject about which volumes have
been written.15 ' Rather than reflecting the entire range of the consider-
able scholarship in this area, it should suffice to present a short and
minimally controversial summary of the most salient features of the
case for a progressive tax.
The starting point of such a summary must be the insight that in-
come has declining marginal utility. Every household has its consump-
tion priorities. If resources available for consumption are meager,
those resources will be marshaled to buy the most important items. As
resources increase and consumption opportunities develop, items are
added to the household budget that are less essential. The absolute
amount of utility that results from expanded consumption opportuni-
ties may be high, but it surely must be lower than the utility derived
from the first dollars of income. This perception is no more than a
direct inference from the principle that households maximize utility. If
151. See, e.g., W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
(1953); Blum, Revisiting the Uneasy Casefor Progressive Taxation, 60 TAXES 16 (1982); Slemrod,
Do We Know How Progressive the Income Tax System Should Be?, 36 NAT'L TAX J. 361 (1983).
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consumption of the nth dollar of income gives the household more sat-
isfaction than the average of all dollars less than n, the household will
not have maximized utility at income levels below n; it could have sub-
stituted the purchase made with the nth dollar for some purchase that
yielded less utility. Because the concept that marginal utility of income
for a particular household generally declines is mathematically demon-
strable, it is universally accepted by economists, so long as they accept
the more basic presumption that consumers maximize utility. 52
The essence of the case for a progressive tax is that burdens should
be distributed evenly. But burdens should be measured by utility sacri-
ficed to the government, not by the dollar levels of taxes. Linking de-
clining marginal utility of income to progressive income taxes requires
two further steps. These are not uncontroversial, and it may be best
simply to state a personal view Qf the best case for a progressive tax.
One must first choose a standard by which the evenness of sacrifice is to
be measured.' 53 The choice preferred by this author is the equal pro-
portional sacrifice theory' 54-that each taxpaying unit should pay
enough dollars in tax that the utility lost to the tax, as a percentage of
total pretax utility, is roughly constant among all taxpaying units.
The second step in linking declining marginal utility to progressive
taxes is to develop a means of comparing households' utility curves. To
say that each household's marginal utility curve declines is not to say
that all decline at the same rate or from the same level. Indeed, it seems
152. There are a few economists who would quibble with this more basic assumption, largely
on the grounds that consumers' tastes are not exogenous. To the extent that tastes are manufac-
tured for consumers by advertisers, the whole concept of utility assumes a somewhat artificial
quality. The best-known proponent of these views, of course, is John Kenneth Galbraith, who has
amplified this basic thought in both The Affuent Society (1958) and The New Industrial State
(1967).
153. The three standard choices are equal absolute sacrifice, equal marginal sacrifice, and
equal proportional sacrifice. MUSGRAVE & MusrRAvE, supra note 58, at 250-53. Under the
"equal absolute sacrifice" concept, each taxpayer is taxed to the extent that his utility lost to taxes
is the same as every other taxpayer's utility loss resulting from the tax. Under "equal marginal
sacrifice," taxpayers in the aggregate pay as taxes those dollars that yield the least utility, so that
the aggregate utility loss is minimized. Under "equal proportional sacrifice," each taxpayer pays
an equivalent fraction of income, using as the numerator the utility lost to the individual taxpayer
through the payment of tax, and using as the denominator the total utility afforded the taxpayer
by his pretax income. Id
154. One economist who has studied the United States income-tax bracket structure has con-
cluded that the equal absolute sacrifice theory provides the most consistent explanation of the rate
structure over time. Mera, Experimental Determination of Relative Marginal Utilities, 83 J. OF
EcON. 464, 472-73 (1969). My reading of his data, however, suggests that the difference between
equal absolute sacrifice and equal marginal sacrifice, in terms of how well each explains congres-
sional tax-rate decisions, is very modest. The data Mera studies, rate schedules from 1948 to 1965,




probable that neither of these is true. How then can a tax rate structure
be imposed that will equilibrate proportional sacrifice?
One promising means of lending objectivity to the utility analysis
is to evaluate sacrifice in terms of "social utility."'155 The social utility
concept ignores the subjective utility actually received by the house-
hold. There is a clear loss of information in this, and perhaps some loss
of justice. Some individuals no doubt work very hard, make large in-
vestments in human capital, and seek out the most remunerative em-
ployments of their skills precisely because their marginal utility curves
are nearly flat; they continue to get a great deal of utility from addi-
tional increments of income even at levels at which other individuals
would be sated. On the other hand, it may not be inappropriate for
society to conclude that a taxpayer's high personal utility from uses of
certain resources-such as a second Rolls Royce-has less social worth
than alternative uses. 156 The social utility concept, then, gives every
household the same utility curve-not on the grounds that they actualy
have the same utility curves, but on the grounds that they may be ap-
propriately treated as though they did. A tax structure that will equili-
brate proportional sacrifice of social utility may then be deduced from
this social utility function.157
To illustrate this approach in an income-averaging context, imag-
ine the following very simple social utility function:
155. See MUSGRAVE & MuSORAVE, supra note 58, at 253-54. See also Stem, The Marginal
Valuation of Income, in STUDIES OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 209 (1977) (for a list of useful refer-
ences, see id at 250-53).
156. The idea of imposing, in effect, the same utility schedule on everyone would be less
troubling if a comprehensive tax base could be employed in the tax system. It would be thor-
oughly impractical to do so, of course, and even the theoretical concept of a comprehensive tax
base may be somewhat ephemeral. See generally Bittker, supra note 61. Nevertheless, in the
absence of a comprehensive tax base, gross inequities can arise by using a social utility approach.
If we imagine two individuals of equal and large earning capacities, one of whom has strong tastes
for money and the things it can buy, the other of whom has a strong taste for leisure, we can see
that the first individual will sacrifice much more of his utility in a progressive tax system based on
social utility than will his leisure-loving counterpart.
157. The tax structure so inferred is not a progressive one as a matter of mathematical neces-
sity; one can imagine social utility functions under which the equal proportional sacrifice doctrine
does not require progressivity. Mera's implicit social utility function, see supra note 154, does
require, however, a progressive tax, as does the hypothetical structure I describe in the text. The
case for a progressive tax as outlined in the text must therefore stipulate aparticular social utility
function, or perhaps a group of such functions having important common characteristics in order
to validate the progressivity element of the tax structure. There is some circularity in this; one is
left with justifying a progressive tax by saying that one is willing to stipulate a social utility func-
tion under which only a progressive tax will exact equal proportional sacrifice. Mera's article, in
fact, involves precisely this sort of bootstrapping. See Mera, supra note 154. Despite this diffi-
culty, however, I am willing to go along with the view that the appropriate social utility schedule is
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$2000 plus 40% of excess over $10,000
Finally, imagine two taxpayers: A, who earns $5000 in year one and
$15,000 in year two, and B, who earns $10,000 in each year. Combin-
ing in Table III these income numbers with the social utility and tax
functions specified above, we can compute pretax income, taxes, and































































Obviously, the left side of Table III makes the conventional case
for income averaging. A and B have the same two-year incomes, but A
158. This particular schedule of utility and tax rates is not a general one; that is, it will not
produce equal proportional sacrifice for all taxpayers. The income numbers in the example were
chosen precisely because they did produce equal proportional sacrifice. Using more complicated
mathematics, it would be possible to determine a more general equal proportional sacrifice tax
rate schedule, although a perfect one would require marginal tax rates to vary continuously, not
by brackets. For this example, that complication would surely be counterproductive. The point of
the example is simply that fluctuation penalties measured in dollars may not turn out to be
penalties at all if measured in utility terms, as they ought to be in evaluating taxpayer sacrifice.
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pays twenty-five percent more tax-a fluctuation penalty of $1000. On
the right side of Table III, however, this fluctuation penalty evaporates.
Because A's tax penalty was incurred in a year in which his marginal
income produced less marginal utility, his sacrifice was no greater than
B's. Both A and B have sacrificed twenty percent of their pretax utility
to the government by the payment of taxes, and have thus satisfied the
equal proportional sacrifice standard.
There is within this analysis a critical but perhaps not wholly obvi-
ous assumption: The analysis works only if it is appropriate to bifur-
cate the two-year experience into two annual parts, each plotted
separately on the taxpayers' annual utility of income curves. If one
were to construct a biennial utility curve, A and B would have the same
total utility, and A's greater dollar tax bill would be associated with a
greater absolute and proportional utility sacrifice. This example thus
illustrates the importance of the choice of time period over which hori-
zontal equity operates, but it does little to resolve that choice.
Proof of the superiority of the annual view is difficult to adduce. It
must also be admitted that in this as in all areas, the annual accounting
period is unlikely to work perfectly. Utility curves represent a tax-
payer's perceptions of his consumption opportunities at any given time,
and his judgments about his position on such a curve will change in
response to discrete events-a salary increase, a stock market slump,
etc.-that do not necessarily coincide with either a calendar year or any
other tax year. Nevertheless, the annual period seems roughly accurate
for sacrifice evaluation purposes, just as it seems roughly accurate for
purposes of computing income. As noted above, the ability of the tax-
payer to anticipate his future income levels with some precision and
confidence is the key. If one knew at the beginning of a two-year (or a
five-year) period what one's income would be during that period, then
that period would surely be the appropriate period over which to meas-
ure utility and sacrifice. In the absence of such knowledge, however,
the usual annual accounting period has substantial appeal.
This is best seen by examining some obvious counterexamples-
taxpayers for whom an annual sacrifice assessment seems inappropri-
ate-and by noting how rare or unlikely such counterexamples are.
The archetype of taxpayers for whom a five-year view would seem ap-
propriate would be a novelist or inventor who spends four years devel-
oping a book or invention, and sells it in the fifth year. Or, in a
somewhat less creative vein, one might imagine a lawyer who spends
five years preparing and trying a large contingent fee case or an entre-
preneur who spends five years developing a new product. Certainly,
such taxpayers exist, perhaps in significant numbers. For the five-year
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sacrifice evaluation to be fully appropriate, however, one must assume
a few additional-and not very likely-facts: that the taxpayer was
reasonably certain of achieving a favorable outcome at the end of his
five-year sojourn; and that he lived accordingly during the five-year
development period, financing a fairly regular consumption pattern out
of prior income or borrowing.
Far more likely is the following scenario: During the years in
which our novelist, for example, is preparing her first book, she lives
like a graduate student in a small and sparsely furnished apartment in
an artsy but essentially deplorable neighborhood. She devotes substan-
tial parts of her work week to waiting on tables or driving a taxi-
indicating by her market behavior that income has a high utility for
her, else she would not work so hard for so little of it. She hopes that
her novel will be a huge success and will radically alter her consump-
tion opportunities, but she has no firm basis for confidence that those
hopes will be fulfilled. Assume that when her novel is finished and
published it is precisely the huge success she hoped for. Our novelist
then moves to a nicer apartment in a nicer neighborhood, though she
spends much of her time at her 200 year-old Connecticut farmhouse
with her Russian wolfhound. When the royalties from the initial wave
of sales begin to taper off she goes on lecture tours at $5000 per stop
and negotiates with her publisher to receive a sizable advance on her
second book, perhaps designed with increasing periodic payments to
offset the decline in royalty income from the first book. If she is well-
advised-and a sizable industry exists for no other purpose than to pro-
vide such advice-she will structure her professional life to accomplish
a good deal of income shifting or deferral by means of Keogh plans,
royalty assignments to trusts, Individual Retirement Accounts, and the
like.159 This will not only reduce her current tax burden, but will pro-
vide a soft landing should she ever run out of creative fuel.
This scenario deserves some reflection. Novelists with this approx-
imate career pattern provide a major archetype for advocates of income
averaging. They are cited in committee reports, 60 congressional testi-
159. A nice detailing of the state of the art, circa 1980, of deferring income for upper-bracket
creative people can be found in George Cooper's delightful article, Cooper, The Avoidance Dy-
namic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics, and Tax Reform, 80 COLuM. L. REV. 1553 (1980).
Cooper's point is that the state of the art may be far too artful, but I presume that my novelist
would be no more concerned with the ethical aspects of tax planning than was Cooper's Sally
Songwriter.
160. See, e.g., H.R. RE. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. A174, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Nsws 1313, 1599.
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mony,16' and articles.162 Yet it is hard to discern any real injustice in
the way the tax system treats such individuals. During her years of
relative poverty, our novelist will be taxed very lightly, if she pays any
federal income tax at all. 63 When she achieves great success, her life-
style is changed, and so is her marginal tax rate. It is not clear why the
fisc owes her any special tax relief at that time because of her prior
poverty; nor is it clear that she should bear any lesser tax burden after
she becomes wealthy than her Connecticut neighbors who have the
same incomes in those years.
Moreover, once our hypothetical novelist ascends to upper-bracket
income levels, she is in a position to do a significant amount of self-
averaging. She can take advantage of the several congressionally-
blessed income-deferral opportunities.'" She can decide when to lec-
ture, when to seek an advance for her next book, and how that advance
and subsequent royalties are to be structured. Similar postsuccess op-
portunities for control of the income flow exist in other fields that are
prominent in the income-averaging literature. An inventor controls his
patent licensing arrangements and has a better chance to secure a
steady flow of research and development contracts after he has proven
himself. A successful lawyer has a wider choice of clients and fee ar-
rangements. An entrepreneur may incorporate her business; control of
both her dividend flow and the exercise of her stock options would give
her a substantial ability to regularize income flow.
Of course, the present averaging system is not based on lifetime
income, and thus does not permanently favor the hypothetical novelist
over her Connecticut neighbors simply because the former was poor for
some portion of her life. A few years after her ascent to a high level of
success, presuming she does not continue on to new and higher levels,
she will find that her base period begins to include her first successful
years and that averaging produces less savings. After three or four
years, the averaging mechanism will have forgotten, as it were, her for-
mer poverty, and she will no longer be eligible for averaging. Is there
then a defense of the present averaging mechanism to be made in terms
of a purely temporary favoritism? Is there, in other words, reason to
believe that our novelist, at least for a few years after her first success, is
161. See, e.g., Tax Reform: Hearings before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1935 (1969) (statement of Michael Waris, Jr.).
162. See, e.g., Ferguson & Hood, supra note 21, at 91; Smith, supra note 150, at 344.
163. A single person with a gross income of $8000 who takes a personal exemption of $1000,
for example, would pay a maximum of $610 of federal income tax, under 1984 rates. See I.R.C.
§ l(c)(3) (1982).
164. See Cooper, supra note 159, at 1554-72.
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less able to bear sizeable tax burdens than those who have been in her
income bracket for a number of years?
There is some appeal to this argument. One who has only begun
to earn a high income is surely not as well off as one who has earned an
equivalent income for many years. The difference, of course, is one of
wealth. If our newly successful novelist is compared with an older
counterpart, a novelist who has been successful for twenty years, one
would expect the latter, through savings and investments, to have at-
tained more wealth than the newly successful novelist. Comparing
these two individuals head-to-head, however, involves a considerable
amount of fudging on the horizontal equity criterion. First of all, com-
parisons based on wealth are somewhat inappropriate when one is
evaluating an income tax. The United States does not tax wealth di-
rectly, 165 and has thus determined to address horizontal equity not in
terms of wealth, but only in terms of income. And even in terms of
income, the comparison of the older novelist with the equally success-
ful younger one is to some degree inapt. Because of their differences in
wealth, it could be inferred that, all else being equal, the older novelist
is likely to have more income from investments and less interest ex-
pense on consumer and mortgage loans than the younger novelist.
166
Thus, though the two novelists may appear comparable in terms of
earnings from writing and lecturing, it is likely that the younger novel-
ist will not be taxed as heavily as the older one, even without income
averaging, simply because she has less income and more deductions.
Comparison of these two individuals, then, does not advance a valid
horizontal equity argument in favor of averaging, because the two are,
in a fundamental way, not equally situated. Further, the inequality of
their situations would be reflected in their taxes without resort to
averaging.
165. There is, of course, a tax on the transfer of wealth. See I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2501 (1982) (estate
and gift taxes). Stationary wealth, however, is immune.
166. In the real world this may not be completely accurate. Our older novelist may well have
spent much of the twenty years since his first great success mastering the ways in which tax bur-
dens can be avoided. His substantial wealth may be invested in municipal bonds, an even larger
and older Connecticut farmhouse, oil drilling, equipment leasing, and other investments designed
precisely not to produce any additional taxable income, and perhaps even to shelter some of his
writing income. True as this may be, it nevertheless cannot seriously be maintained that income
averaging is defensible as an antidote to the problem of erosion of the tax base at the upper end of
the income distribution. This would amount to an argument that averaging is necesary to give our
younger novelist a few years to learn how to play the shelter game. The fact is that if the older
novelist has more wealth, he should have more economic income, and if the tax system fails to
translate that economic income into taxable income, it is because of failings that have nothing to
do with income averaging.
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The prototypical averaging cases therefore suggest: (1) that aver-
aging is not generally necessary when the taxpayer is ascending to the
upper income brackets, because the annual assessment of utility sacri-
fice provides the more accurate representation of the taxpayer's situa-
tion; and, (2) that once that ascent is complete, the taxpayer will
typically have enough control over future income that he can minimize
fluctuation penalties.
One objection that could be made to these generalizations is that
they are, even if accepted as substantially true, no more than general-
izations. One might argue that averaging is needed nevertheless to take
care of those situations in which the taxpayer's lifestyle does not fully
adjust to the current income level, perhaps because of the obvious im-
permanence of that income level, and the taxpayer has no real control
over future income flows. The best example may be a taxpayer of mod-
est baseline income who wins a large lump-sum lottery. 167 The tax-
payer knows that the income bulge will not likely be repeated, and he
will-for purposes of assessing his consumption opportunities-implic-
itly annuitize the lottery award over his remaining life. 168 Under this
approach, the taxpayer's consumption opportunities do widen, but the
extent of the improvement would be vastly overstated by that year's
income. Absent some form of averaging, however, that year's income
would be the basis of the utility sacrifice computation performed by the
tax system.
It must be conceded that the presence of averaging for such cases
improves the fairness of the tax system. If such cases can be culled
from other situations in which income fluctuates but no real inequity
exists, then the tax system should attempt to do so. Some of the pro-
posals made below offer hope of distinguishing the cases deserving re-
lief from those that do not.169 If, on the other hand, it is determined
that the tax system cannot distinguish fluctuation situations deserving
relief from those not deserving relief with sufficient accuracy in a suffi-
ciently administrable manner, then it must be recognized that one of
167. It is my impression that most of the legal lotteries in the United States, however, pay their
largest awards in twenty-year or lifetime allotments, which eliminates the fluctuation problem in
that the postlottery annual income of the winner accurately measures his annual consumption
opportunities, and the normal tax schedule will exact the appropriate utility sacrifice.
168. This hypothetical example comes very close to the actual facts of Goldstein v. Commis-
sioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), a gambling-winnings case, which arose prior to the advent of
income averaging, discussed infra at note 247 and accompanying text. Ironically, gambling win-
nings, which present perhaps the best case for multiyear averaging, were intentionally excluded
from the averaging provisions from 1964 until 1969.
169. In particular, my Tax Averaging Account proposal, infra notes 247-58 and accompanying
text, would offer, I believe, nearly perfect relief for the one-year lottery winner.
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the costs of achieving the appropriate multiyear horizontal equity in
the lottery case will be the creation of substantial and inappropriate
horizontal inequities on an annual basis for the athletes and novelists
whose situations were discussed earlier. 70 If this essential trade-off is
observed, then the appropriate solution must be to design the system to
deal with the relatively common case, not the relatively unusual one.
For the reasons explained earlier, income averaging in the more com-
mon case can be more accurately viewed as causing annual horizontal
inequity, rather than as relieving multiyear horizontal inequity.
2. Horizontal Inequity in the Present System. The preceding
subsection was intended to show that the horizontal equity case for any
income-averaging system is much weaker than is generally supposed.
The intention of this subsection is to remind the reader, regardless of
his convictions concerning the theoretical need for income averaging,
that the existing federal averaging system provides only sporadic relief
for fluctuation penalties.
The present averaging provisions appear to be quite general. They
apply to all types of income,' 7 1 and to taxpayers in all income brackets,
marital situations, and age groups. These provisions were designed to
provide an averaging device that would be "generally available,"'
72
and were intended to replace the hodgepodge of special provisions that
existed prior to 1964.173 These efforts at achieving generality must be
judged a failure, however, for the apparent generality breaks down at
so many points as to be largely spurious.
Most of the departures from generality were quite intentional, if
ill-advised. Congress consciously chose to make it difficult, although
not uniformly so, to achieve eligibility for averaging early in one's ca-
reer. 174 Congress also chose not to allow averaging in years when in-
come declines. 75 These choices preclude averaging for many
taxpayers who would seem to be as deserving as anyone of relief from
fluctuation penalties. For example, imagine the plight of a football
player who goes directly from college to a lucrative but brief profes-
sional career, after which he coaches high-school football. He may
have earned literally eighty percent of his real lifetime earnings be-
170. See supra notes 150, 159-66 and accompanying text.
171. That is, they apply to earnings from employment or self-employment, earnings from cap-
ital, and, since 1969, capital gains and gambling earnings.
172. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1313, 1418.
173. Id
174. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
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tween his twenty-first and thirty-first birthdays, but he would obtain no
benefit from averaging. He could not spread his early high-income
years backward, because of the support requirement, 76 nor could he
spread his last high-income years forward, since doing so would re-
quire a downward averaging mechanism that Congress elected not to
enact. 1
77
Congress had reasonably acceptable alternatives to each of these
choices that would not have disqualified the taxpayers who were made
ineligible by Congress's action.17 8 But, acting principally out of consid-
erations of administrability, 179 Congress decided to constrict the range
of taxpayers eligible for averaging.
Congress made another departure from generality that was not
quite so freely chosen; it had to choose some time frame over which
averaging was to be computed. The choice of any such time frame
necessarily precluded the choice of all alternative time frames, even
though alternative periods might be more advantageous to particular
taxpayers at particular times. The rigidity of the period choice, coupled
with the mechanical features of the computation-namely, the $3000
averagable income threshold' 80 and the thirty-percent base-period in-
come computation' 8'-produce some clear horizontal inequities be-
tween taxpayers whose income fluctuation patterns happen to fit within
the five-year period and equivalent taxpayers whose fluctuation pat-
terns do not.
This can be seen by examining a few pairs of individuals who are
roughly equally situated, but whose eligibility for, and benefits from,
income averaging are likely to be quite different. For example, suppose
A and B are taxpayers in a creative field, who produce a major work
infrequently, but achieve a fairly steady baseline income through the
regular production of minor works. If A produces a major work every
three years, and enjoys a sizable burst of income in such years, he will
176. See Heidel v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 95 (1971), discussed supra note 55 and accompany-
ing text.
177. Of course, the taxpayer might be able to defer some of his income to lessen his fluctuation
penalty, see supra note 138, but his ability to do so owes nothing to the existence of the income-
averaging provisions.
178. For example, a simple approach that allowed every taxpayer to compute his fluctuation
penalty, as defined supra note 3 and accompanying text, and allowed a credit for some fixed
percentage of that penalty, would cure both of the problems identified in this paragraph, as well as
the vertical equity problem posed by the threshold amount. See infra notes 205-20 and accompa-
nying text.
179. See H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 112, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG, &
AD. NEws 1313, 1420.
180. See I.R.C. § 1301 (1982), discussed supra notes 52-54.
181. See I.R.C. § 1302(a)(1) (1982), discussed supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
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very likely be able to use income averaging. His base period will con-
sist of one high-income year (from his last major work three years ago)
and three low-income years. 182 If B produces a major work every other
year, he is likely to find averaging less helpful, because his base period
will include two high-income years and two low-income years. 183 He
may not be able to average at all,184 and if he is eligible, he will save
relatively little because of his larger amount of unaveragable income,
compared to A.
The arbitrary nature of the five-year averaging period can also be
seen by examining two other taxpayers, C and D, who have the follow-
ing incomes over an eight-year period:
Table IV
Income by Year (in thousands of dollars)
Taxpayer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
C 18 18 21 21 26 26 31 31
D 26 26 21 21 18 18 31 31
C and D have identical total incomes, and would be taxed identically
under a system with no averaging, because they have an identical mix
of incomes by year-only the distribution among years is different. Pre-
sumably, any eight-year averaging system would provide identical re-
lief to C and D. Under the present five-year system, however, C will
not be eligible for averaging in any of the eight years, but D will be
eligible in years seven and eight. In those years, five-year horizontal
equity is achieved at the expense of both annual horizontal equity and
eight-year horizontal equity.
These two examples illustrate the randomness introduced by a
choice of any particular fixed averaging period. Any one taxpayer may
find that his fluctuations may be too long, too short, or just right. But
this does not produce horizontal equity, unless one is prepared to argue
that those whose cycles are just right are the ones most deserving of
relief.
182. If, for example, A produces a major work in year six (and in all other years divisible by
three), his base period will consist of years two through five, only one of which, year three, will
have been a high-income year.
183. IfB produces a major work in year six (and in all even-numbered years), his base period
will consist of years two through five, two of which, years two and four, will have been high-
income years.
184. For example, a taxpayer who alternates years of $30,000 income with years of $50,000
income will never be able to use income averaging under the present law. His base-period income
will always total $160,000, 30% of which is $48,000, which would yield only $2000 of averagable
income in each potential computation year.
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One last example of similarly situated taxpayers demonstrates that
the averaging provisions treat aberrantly good years better than aber-
rantly bad ones. Again, total incomes are constant, this time over a six-
year period. And each taxpayer has one year in which his income is
$30,000 higher or lower than that taxpayer's usual income:
Table V
Income by years (in thousands of dollars)
Taxpayer 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
E 50 50 50 50 20 50 270
F 40 40 40 40 70 40 270
Taxpayer F has a peak in year five, and can save a significant
amount of tax by averaging in that year.18 5 E has a valley in the fifth
year and cannot average his income in that year. He might hope to
average in the following year: One aspect of the averaging mechanics
that mitigates the prohibition on downward averaging is that a tax-
payer's valleys, while ineligible to be computation years, can be base
years for some future computation year.186 A taxpayer can hope, then,
that some part of his fluctuation penalty will be relieved when and if
his income rebounds. In this case, however, taxpayer E will not be able
to average in year six, since thirty percent of his income in years two
through five is $51,000, which leaves him with no averagable income in
the sixth year. Nor will he have any averagable income in year seven
or in subsequent years, as long as his income in those years remains at
the normal level of $50,000. Taxpayer E, then, will never be in a posi-
tion to relieve any of his fluctuation penalty.
It is clear that none of these similarly situated, dissimilarly treated
pairs of taxpayers are handled satisfactorily from a horizontal-equity
viewpoint. It is also clear from these examples that it would be more
accurate to characterize the present income-averaging mechanism as
one that provides relief from fluctuation penalties principally for one
type of fluctuation: growth.187 The example of the novelist in the pre-
185. D's tax in year five would be $19,368 without averaging. With averaging, D's tax liability
would be $18,968, yielding a savings of $400.
186. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
187. David, Groves, Miller & Wiegner, supra note 22, at 279, make this point. Their tentative
recommendation is to reverse the approach of the present system, and allow averaging only in
years in which there is a reduction in income. Their proposal would certainly be an improvement
over the present system. I believe, however, that it makes the same mistake as to downward
averaging that the present system does in the case of upward averaging; it ignores the fact that in




ceding subsection 8 8 thus seems an apt example of a taxpayer who is a
major beneficiary of the present income-averaging system but who has
a weak equitable claim to such relief.
3. Vertical Equity. The least that could be expected of a tax
provision not intended explicitly to shift tax burdens away from high
bracket taxpayers is that the provision be technically, if not practically,
neutral with respect to the income level of the taxpayer. The present
income-averaging provisions, however, do not satisfy even this mild de-
sideratum. As noted above, 8 9 use of an averagable-income minimum
of greater than $3000 as an eligibility threshold means unambiguously
that lower-income taxpayers must experience a greater fluctuation in
income, on a percentage basis, to be able to take advantage of income
averaging.190
The statistics on the incomes of taxpayers who use income averag-
ing apparently reflect this built-in bias; 191 they may also reflect other,
more subtle biases against low-bracket taxpayers. Some analysts have
suggested that the complexity and appearance of complexity of the
averaging schedule prevent those who lack both professional advice
and significant education, both of which are presumably correlated
with income, from taking full advantage of averaging. 192 Whatever the
causes, statistics on the use of averaging by income groups present a
clear pattern. The benefits of income averaging are highly concen-
trated in the top five to ten percent of the income distribution. Table
VI presents data on this distribution. 193 They show that the dollars
saved by averaging per taxpayer increases with income. More impor-
tantly, they show that the percentage of the aggregate tax liability of
each group that was relieved by income averaging is by far the greatest
in two income groups: the $50,000 to $100,000 group and the $100,000
to $200,000 group. Because these groups respectively constitute the
95.5 through 99.3 percentiles and the 99.3 through 99.9 percentiles of
188. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
190. It should be noted that many very wealthy taxpayers never suffer fluctuation penalties,
and also obtain no benefit from income averaging, because their incomes place them in the highest
marginal rate brackets even in their lowest income years. Thus, a taxpayer who regularly earns
$250,000 per year will suffer no fluctuation penalty if his income in one year leaps to $750,000.
Nor will he be eligible for income averaging. This aspect of the tax rate structure explains why it
is that the income groups just below the top groups appear to benefit most from income averaging.
See supra note 40, and infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text, particularly Table VI.
192. See Steuerle, supra note 24, at 21.
193. The table is derived from 1981 STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 10, at 72-75 (Table
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the taxpayer income distribution, 94 it would appear that income aver-
aging in practice shifts tax burdens away from groups that appear quite





Percentage of (in Percentage of Tax
Taxpayers Within thousands Savings Per Liability For Whole
Adjusted Gross Bracket Who Use of Taxpayer Bracket Saved By
Income Bracket Averaging dollars) Who Averages Averaging
Under $5000 0 0 $0 0
5000-10,000 .2 5353 189 .1
10,000-15,000 1.5 34,866 170 .2
15,000-20,000 4.7 110,809 216 .5
20,000-50,000 15.1 1,655,285 370 1.1
50,000-100,000 34.5 1,293,905 1083 2.5
100,000-200,000 26.2 508,184 3778 2.3
200,000-500,000 16.2 220,411 11,602 1.7
500,000-1,000,000 13.1 54,730 28,490 1.3
1,000,000 + 10.6 35,897 64,796 .7
Total 7.3 3,919,441 597
There is, of course, one obvious conceptual objection to this gener-
alization, and, indeed, to the validity and usefulness of Table VI. Be-
cause the income-averaging structure permits averaging only in years
when the taxpayer's income is high relative to prior years, we cannot,
on the basis of the data in Table VI alone, be certain that we have
correctly identified the taxpayers who benefit from averaging in terms
of their normal income brackets. The apparent prosperity of averagers
may be a very temporary condition.
Rebutting this possibility conclusively is difficult, but there is
much evidence that suggests that averagers are approximately as pros-
perous on a long-term basis as they are in the year or years in which
they average. Working with a data file that is more complete than any
publicly available, one study found that, among taxpayers who used
income averaging in any of the years 1967 through 1970, thirty-four
percent used averaging in at least two consecutive years, while about
fourteen percent used averaging in three consecutive years and five per-
cent used averaging in four consecutive years. 95 For these taxpayers,
taxable income in any given computation year may undersiale their
194. Id at 34 (Table 1.1).
195. See Steurele, supra note 24, at 22-23.
[Vol. 1984:509
INCOME AVERA GING
long-term prosperity; their incomes are not fluctuating but rather are
growing. Overall, this study found that the average 1971 taxable in-
come of all people who elected averaging in 1970 was only $1929 less
than their average 1970 taxable income,196 suggesting that this group
was about as well off in the year after they averaged as they were when
they elected averaging.
It is also possible to gauge the prosperity of averagers in their base
periods, rather than by looking at their subsequent income levels. Al-
though this cannot be done with great precision, one can infer, from the
savings from averaging reported in the Statistics of Income, the aver-
agers' approximate base periods. For example, in 1981, income-aver-
aging taxpayers in the $50,000 to $100,000 income group had mean
adjusted gross incomes of $64,333, mean taxable incomes of $53,123,
and mean tax savings from income averaging of $1083.197 This income
bracket is of particular interest for three reasons: (1) this is the income
group for which income averaging accomplished the greatest percent-
age abatement of tax liability otherwise owed; (2) this is the income
bracket in which the highest proportion of taxpayers use income aver-
aging; and (3) this is the income bracket in which the median dollar of
income-averaging tax savings falls.198 Using a taxpayer with the mean
tax savings and mean taxable income within this bracket as the para-
digm, one can reconstruct the base-period income consistent with that
amount of savings. The total base-period income consistent with the
data is $111,123.1 99 Because there was substantial inflation from 1977
to 1980, this base-period income must be adjusted to be compared with
the 1981 income. The result, in 1981 dollars, is that our paradigmatic
averaging taxpayer had an average annual taxable income over the
four-year base period of almost $36,000, which is comparable to an
adjusted gross income of about $45,000.200 This is below that tax-
196. See Steurele, supra note 24, at 25.
197. 1981 STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 10, at 72-75 (Table 3.1).
198. Id Using linear interpolation, it can be estimated that the 1981 adjusted gross income of
the taxpayer who saved the median dollar from averaging was about $56,000. That is, about half
the dollars saved through averaging were saved by taxpayers with incomes higher than that, and
about half were saved by taxpayers with lower incomes.
199. Id
200. The mean consumer price indices for 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980 were, respectively, 181.5,
195.4, 217.4, and 246.8. The arithmetic mean of this series is 210.3, which is .772 of the 1981 mean
consumer price index of 272.4. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1982-83, supra note 71, at 461 (Table
757). Dividing the $111,123 base-period income by the four years in the base period, and dividing
that result by .772 yields an average base-period income-in 1981 dollars-of $35,988. This taxa-
ble income figure can be converted into an adjusted gross income estimate of $44,75 1, by multiply-
ing it by the ratio of adjusted gross income to taxable income for all taxpayers in 1981. This ratio
was 1.243 to 1. 1981 STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 10, at 34 (Table 1.1, cols. 8, 11).
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payer's 1981 adjusted gross income by more than $19,000. It is, never-
theless, about three times the median adjusted gross income among all
taxpayers in 1981 and would place the taxpayer well within the top ten
percent of the income distribution.20'
Thus, viewing the averaging taxpayer from the viewpoint of both
his prior and subsequent income levels provides considerable evidence
that, for typical averagers, the computation-year income is somewhat
higher than income in prior years, but about the same as it will be in
subsequent years. Overall, one may reasonably presume that the com-
putation-year income of averagers is fairly representative of their pros-
perity, at least with respect to the immediately surrounding years.
If this presumption is valid, averaging must be viewed as a signifi-
cant erosion of the progressivity of the tax structure. Table VI speaks
for itself. A tax feature that saves thousands of dollars of tax liability
for a large percentage of taxpayers in the highest tax brackets, but is
substantially unavailable to taxpayers in lower brackets, certainly re-
quires close scrutiny. The distributional consequences might be viewed
as less disturbing and largely incidental if the horizontal equity argu-
ments favoring averaging were powerful. As demonstrated earlier,
however, those horizontal equity arguments are seriously flawed.
Thus, the burden-shifting effects of averaging are more difficult to
ignore.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT AVERAGING SYSTEM
The argument above suggests that outright repeal of the income
averaging provisions would save considerable tax revenue, improve the
vertical equity of the tax system, and put the horizontal equity of the
tax system on a sounder footing by consistently using an annual rather
than a multiyear standard of measurement. Because immediate and
complete repeal is a somewhat radical suggestion, it may be worthwhile
to explore some alternative ideas for legislative initiatives that are
somewhat more modest.
The first proposal would change the basic computational mechan-
ics of income averaging. Even if one were to accept as appropriate the
multiyear horizontal equity view, it must be conceded that the present
averaging formula produces unnecessarily uneven relief for income-
fluctuation penalties. The first alternative approach proposed 20 2 is no
201. 1981 STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 10, at 34 (Table 1.1, col. 2). This table indicates
that 4.2% of all 1981 taxpayers had adjusted gross incomes in excess of $50,000, and that 4.4% had
adjusted gross incomes between $40,000 and $50,000. The interpolated median adjusted gross
income for all taxpayers in 1981 was between $14,000 and 15,000. Id
202. See infra notes 205-20 and accompanying text.
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more complicated than the present formula and is considerably more
accurate in providing relief. Furthermore, it could be adjusted to levels
that would produce less revenue loss than does the current averaging
formula, and could thus be viewed as an alternative to the proposals to
this effect presently before Congress.
20 3
The second proposal, facilitated by the new formula proposed in
the first approach, is for institution of an option to average when in-
come declines precipitously. If one accepts the multiyear view of hori-
zontal equity, one must also concede that the income-fluctuation
problem is symmetrical:204 downward fluctuations occasion as large a
fluctuation penalty as do upward ones.
The third proposal is one that is more consistent with the view
presented in Section II of this article, to the effect that an annual assess-
ment of horizontal equity is normally preferable. Recognizing that
there are some exceptional cases that deserve relief, however, this third
proposal would allow taxpayers in certain exceptional cases to elect a
self-averaging device to spread forward the tax burden of large,
nonrecurrent items of income received in a single tax year.
A. A New Computational Framework.
The conventional justification for an averaging system is that a
taxpayer whose income fluctuates over a period of years should not
bear a larger overall tax burden over that period of years than a tax-
payer whose income is more regular.20 5 Yet the computational frame-
work of the present averaging system is not tied in any direct way to the
amount of the tax penalty caused by income fluctuation. As noted
above,20 6 the averaging system occasionally relieves all, sometimes
none, and most often some but not all of the fluctuation penalty, in a
pattern that lacks any principled basis. At least four problems with the
computational system produce this result. The first is that the $3000
averagable income threshold needlessly discriminates against low-in-
come taxpayers, who must experience wider fluctuations of income, in
percentage terms, to be eligible for averaging.20 7 A related problem,
also noted above,208 is that the use of any threshold amount, whether
203. See infra notes 259-68 and accompanying text.
204. Indeed, this has been explicitly recognized by several commentators on income averag-
ing, and is disputed by none of whom I know. See David, Groves, Miller & Weigner, supra note
21, at 285, and Steuerle, supra note 24, at 27, for an explicit discussion of the need for downward
averaging.
205. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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stated in dollars or percentages, creates points of discontinuity in the
rate schedule-points where an additional dollar of income actually
lowers tax liability.20 9 The third problem is that using thirty percent of
base-period income as the nonaveragable income amount, instead of
twenty-five percent, the true annual average of base-period income, has
an unnecessarily erratic effect on the proportion of the fluctuation pen-
alty that will be relieved. If the true average annual base-period in-
come is very close to the boundary of a rate bracket, use of thirty
percent as the unaveragable amount may make little difference in the
savings from averaging. If there is some distance between the true av-
erage and the top of the bracket in which that average income lies,
stepping up the unaveragable share to thirty percent in some sense con-
sumes the favorable effect of shifting some of the computation-year in-
come into that favorable rate bracket. Finally, the present formula
ignores any fluctuation penalty that takes place among the years in the
base period. The mechanism simply compares average base-period in-
come to computation-year income, regardless of whether the base-pe-
riod income itself was regular or erratic.2 10
These problems could be eliminated if the computation method
were focused directly on the fluctuation penalty. That is the central
insight of this suggestion; a comprehensive resolution of all the associ-
ated details will not be attempted here. To make this suggestion more
concrete, however, the following approach is offered: The taxpayer
would first total his taxable income for the current tax year and the
four preceding tax years.21' He would then divide that five-year taxa-
ble income total into five equal amounts and compute the tax that
would have been owed had the income been received evenly over the
five-year period.212 This will yield a five-year tax total that would have
applied had the taxpayer's income been received evenly over the five-
year period; the total could be called the "zero fluctuation tax."
This could then be compared with the actual tax liability the tax-
payer would be exposed to absent averaging. This would consist of the
209. See supra note 54.
210. Of course, fluctuation in the base period may or may not have been partly relieved by
averaging in prior years. It will not have been if the taxpayer was ineligible for averaging, or did
not have sufficient fluctuation to average, or had substantial downward fluctuation.
211. There is no magic in the five-year period, but no compelling reason to change it either, if
one insists on using a multiyear period rather than an annual period.
212. This could be computed in either of two ways: The simpler way would be to use current
rates, applied to one-fifth of total income, and then to multiply that result by five; somewhat more
complicated, but more accurate, especially if there is a major rate change during the period, would
be to compute each year's tax using the rates that actually applied to each year. Rate schedules for
the four previous years could be provided with the instructions to the averaging schedules.
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tax already paid in the base period,213 plus the tentative tax on the cur-
rent year's income. This total may be called "actual tax." This compu-
tation imposes no additional data retrieval burden on the taxpayer-
compared with the present system-because the taxpayer already must
locate his base-year 1040 forms to find base-period taxable income.
214
Because it would be undesirable to have a system in which virtu-
ally all taxpayers were eligible for averaging, a normal fluctuation
range should be established. This choice should be made by Congress,
and should reflect both equity and revenue-loss concerns. For exam-
ple, Congress might decide that no relief would be available unless the
"actual tax" were greater than 1.05 times the "zero fluctuation tax." To
control revenue loss, Congress might also decide to limit relief to some
certain percentage of the excess of the "actual tax" over 1.05 times the
"zero fluctuation tax." Congress might decide, for example, to relieve
seventy-five percent of the "excess fluctuation penalty." Thus, under
this approach a taxpayer would owe an amount-which might be
called "averaged tax"--equal to the tentative tax in the computation
year minus seventy-five percent of the difference between "actual tax"
and 1.05 times the "zero fluctuation tax." This is illustrated for a hypo-










Averaged Tax = Tentative Tax - .75
Tax))]
Averaged Tax = 15,168 - .75 [32,750
Averaged Tax = 13,986
Zero Fluctuation Tax







[Actual Tax - (1.05 (Zero Fluctuation
- (1.05 (29,690))]
213. Tax credits should probably be ignored in this computation at all times. Thus, by "actual
tax paid," I mean the tentative tax computed before reduction to reflect credits. This would be the
amount shown on line 38 of the 1040 Form for 1983, and the comparable line of other year's
forms.
214. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
215. For convenience, the tax is computed as though the 1984 joint return rates applied to all
tax years.
216. This is simply one-fifth of the five-year total for taxable income shown in column 2.
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Thus, the hypothetical taxpayer has saved $1182 of the $3060 fluc-
tuation penalty he incurred. The fluctuation penalty was approxi-
mately 10.3% of the zero fluctuation tax; approximately thirty-eight
percent of that total penalty was relieved.
Although the present income-averaging structure provides approx-
imately the same relief in the above example,217 the proposed system
has several advantages:
(1) The proposed system would relieve thirty-eight percent of the fluc-
tuation penalty of any taxpayer who experienced a 10.3% fluctuation
penalty, regardless of that taxpayer's general income level. In contrast,
the present system tends to provide greater relief as income
increases. 2
18
(2) The proposed system accounts for fluctuation penalties incurred
during the base period. For example, if income had been $27,500 in
each of the first four years, the proposed system would only provide
$565 of relief, reflecting the fact that the fluctuation penalty would have
been less. In contrast, the present system lumps together all base-pe-
riod income, regardless of its distribution, and regardless of the fluctua-
tion penalty actually incurred during that period.219
(3) The proposed system would relieve none of the fluctuation penalty
if it were within a "normal" range, but would relieve more of the pen-
alty the more "abnormal" the fluctuation penalty was. As noted,220 the
present system is erratic; it relieves varying amounts of the fluctuation
penalties depending on a variety of circumstances, but reflects no prin-
cipled basis.
B. Averaging W'hen Income Declines.
If there is, under a multiyear sacrifice approach, a horizontal ineq-
uity problem presented by annual reporting of income, it is likely to be
most severe in the case of taxpayers who receive a high proportion of
their lifetime earnings within a few years. Actors, athletes, models, and
others in the entertainment industry provide the best examples. For
successful individuals in these fields, it is the rule rather than the excep-
217. Averaging would reduce computation-year taxes by $1260 under present law.
218. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
219. An ancillary benefit of the proposed system should be noted: Although a taxpayer in this
system could average in consecutive years if he wished to, simply using the "averaged tax" figure
rather than the "tentative tax" figure for years in which he averages, there would be some incen-
tive for a taxpayer with fluctuation penalties to average only every five years. All fluctuation
penalties are preserved, and are more likely to exceed the 105% threshold. In contrast, eligible
taxpayers must average each year under the present system, or lose the tax savings of averaging
for that year. Thus, the proposed system could reduce compliance costs.
220. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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tion that their success is dazzling but brief. For those who are well-
advised, the decline in income after the peak years can be considerably
cushioned. 22' An individual who has not been able to prepare himself,
however, may incur a severe fluctuation penalty.
Nevertheless, that individual may find that the present averaging
system provides little relief, especially if his high-bracket years number
more than three or four. From the fifth high-income year forward,
222
the taxpayer will probably be precluded from averaging by the absence
of any low-income base years; 223 when his computation-year income
declines from its peak, his averagable income will fall to zero.
224
The case for extending relief to such taxpayers is quite compelling,
and many commentators have noted that the absence of a downward-
averaging device to spread income forward in high-bracket years is a
serious shortcoming of the present system.225 Certain commentators
would permit only downward averaging, 226 arguing that equity consid-
erations are compelling only in such cases.227 Nevertheless, Congress
has resisted the advice of these commentators for several reasons, some
of which have been discussed earlier.228 It may be worthwhile, how-
221. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
222. If the taxpayer does not have four years of self-support prior to his high-income years, he
will be ineligible for averaging even during the first four high-income years. See I.R.C. § 1303(c)
(1982); supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
223. Of course, he may have some relatively low-income years even if his income was high
throughout the base period. However, if the relatively low years are absolutely high enough to put
the taxpayer in or near the highest marginal tax bracket, then the taxpayer will obtain little or no
relief from averaging. See supra notes 126-29, 190 and accompanying text.
224. It should be noted here that computation-year income can decline slightly without neces-
sarily precluding averaging. Because each computation year is compared with the entire base
period, and not just the previous year, there are situations where a taxpayer with a declining
income-even one which has declined for four years--could be eligible. If a taxpayer's five-year
income stream is zero, w, x,y, z, respectively, there are combinations of values for those variables
in which w > x >y > z, yet .3(w+x+y) + 3000] < z, which means the taxpayer would, if other-
wise eligible, be able to average in the fifth year. For example, the sequence $0, $60,000, $59,000,
$58,000, $57,000 would give a taxpayer $3900 of averagable income in the fifth year-enough to
maintain eligibility for averaging. This is not, however, a true counterexample to the point made
in the text. In this example, part of the $57,000 income in year five is, in effect, being spread back
to the first base-period year. It is not the case that the peak years in the middle are being averaged
forward to a declining year.
225. See, e.g., Ferguson & Hood, supra note 21, at 93; Goldberg, Income Averaging Under the
Revenue Act of1964, 74 YALE L. J. 465, 467 (1964); Klein & Wiegner, Income Averagingfor Tax
Purposes-Sources of a Statutory Solution, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 147, 159-61 (1965).
226. David, Groves, Miller & Weigner, supra note 21, at 279.
227. Messrs. David, Groves, Miller and Weigner are unmoved, as am I, by the plight of the
novelist described supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text, or by arguments that reflect the
view that an annual assessment of utility sacrifice is inferior to a lifetime or multiyear perspective.
They would abandon the annual view, however, should the novelist's income ever decline signifi-
cantly. See David, Groves, Miller & Weigner, supra note 21, at 279.
228. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
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ever, to review these counterarguments briefly at this point to see which
of them may present valid concerns, and how such concerns may be
met.
One argument in defense of the present system is that it does offer
some relief for downward fluctuations, in the sense that a taxpayer's
years of relatively low income may become base years for some future
averaging computation. This is a limited defense because many tax-
payers may not ever return to higher income levels, or may not do so
soon enough to include the low-income years in a base period for aver-
aging. Additionally, the computational mechanics of averaging oper-
ate to adjust upward the base-period years, by using thirty percent
rather than the true average of twenty-five percent as the unaveragable
income.229 This means that downward fluctuations, even if they are
ultimately accounted for in an averaging computation in a subsequent,
upward fluctuation year, are systematically disfavored by the present
averaging system.
Another major counterargument is that downward averaging
amounts to a recomputation of a tax already collected. The present
system relieves the high marginal rates that a taxpayer may be exposed
to in a year of relatively high income by adjusting the tax in that year.
A downward averaging system, on the other hand, relieves high margi-
nal rates not in the high-income year, but in some subsequent year.
This is thought by some to threaten the finality of tax collections. One
would never know if the revenue collected in a particular year would
remain collected or would have to be refunded because of subsequent
events. That unknown contingent claims might be attached to revenue
for a particular year is thought by some to be undesirable.
This view, however, is difficult to defend given that: (1) virtually
every dollar of corporate income tax collected is subject to refund if
loss carrybacks230 develop in subsequent tax years; (2) several Code
sections that apply primarily to individuals also allow for refunding a
prior year's tax payment;2 31 (3) taxpayers may generally amend their
returns within the three-year statute of limitations;2 32 (4) the tax year of
most individuals-the calendar year233-does not match the fiscal year
229. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
230. I.R.C. § 172 (1982). This section also applies to individuals, but, for a variety of reasons,
is of benefit mostly to corporations.
231. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1311, 1341 (1982).
232. I.R.C. § 6501 (1982).
233. Approximately 99% of individual returns are for the calendar year. See 1981 STATISTICS
OF INCOME, supra note 10, at 11.
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used by the government for budgetary purposes; 234 and (5) most tax-
payers' earnings are overwithheld and therefore those taxpayers receive
refunds anyway.235 It would not seem to be a matter of great signifi-
cance whether the refund is of tax withheld in the prior calendar year
or tax paid in some reasonably recent prior year.
It is true that downward averaging might actually produce a nega-
tive tax liability in a computation year. Even that, however, would not
be unprecedented, because there are other sections of the Code in
which prior payment of a tax can be refunded in a year in which there
was no tax liability.236 Furthermore, if the "negative tax" feature of
this proposal were thought to be undesirable by Congress, it could eas-
ily provide that averaging could be used to reduce tax liability, but not
below zero.23
7
A more serious objection to general downward averaging is the
"floodgates" problem. Downward fluctuations are experienced by
most people at retirement 23 8 -especiafly if fluctuations are measured,
as they are for income-averaging purposes, in terms of taxable income,
which excludes most Social Security payments.239 This problem is
more a practical objection to downward averaging than a principled
one. It does not deny that retirees incur fluctuation penalties; it merely
suggests that such penalties are so common, and so costly to relieve,
that the problem is one that must be endured.
There are two possible responses to this. First, as a matter of fair-
ness,240 one may argue that if the government believes relief of fluctua-
tion penalties is appropriate, it ought not to carve out specific groups
for less favorable treatment without some principled reason for such an
exception. And, as a practical matter, it may be that modest adjust-
234. The federal government has, since 1975, operated on a fiscal year beginning each October
I.
235. See supra note 27.
236. This is clearest, perhaps, in I.R.C. § 1341(b)(1) (1982), but it is also possible under I.R.C.
§§ 172, 1311 (1982).
237. Such a provision would have a counterpart in the present averaging provisions, which do
not allow negative base-period income. See Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d
604 (9th Cir. 1981); Beckman v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 44, 51 (D. Kan. 1975).
238. Pechman mentions this as the principal objection to downward averaging. See J.
PECHMAN, supra note 58, at 122.
239. The Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 121, 97 Stat. 65, 80 (codi-
fied at 26 U.S.C.A. § 86 (1984)), effective for benefits received after December 31, 1983, have
made a portion of Social Security payments taxable to the recipient.
240. The fairness point here is somewhat blunted by the fact that most people eventually re-
tire. As noted, supra note 57 and accompanying text, this situation may resemble the tax conse-
quences of Congress's decision to disallow commuting expense deductions. However, this does
not completely answer the fairness concern; all retirees do not incur the same fluctuation penalty,
so disregarding everyone's retirement fluctuation penalty does not treat everyone equally.
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ments-such as requiring that tax-favored benefits be added back to
the computation-year income for purposes of computing a fluctuation
penalty--could significantly reduce revenue loss.
Alternatively, one might concede that retirees should be excluded,
but argue that it does not follow that individuals who are not retired
should be precluded from downward averaging simply because there is
a perceived need to exclude retirees from relief of fluctuation penalties.
Congress removes retirees from benefited classes when it perceives the
need, even in the context of the Internal Revenue Code. For example,
one of the conditions for deduction of moving expenses is that the tax-
payer be a full-time employee or perform services as a self-employed
individual on a full-time basis.241 Similarly, Congress has effectively
precluded retired spouses from the benefits of the "marriage penalty"
relief provisions by defining the qualified earned income on which the
deduction is based in a manner that excludes pensions, annuities, and
similar payments.242 Of course, a pure employment test may not be the
best approach in this case, because downward averaging may be most
needed by disabled or unemployed individuals. The optimal solution
may be to create a combined age and employment test, by which a
taxpayer under the age of sixty is presumed to be in the labor force,
while those above that age could average only if they were actually still
in the labor force.243 This would resemble the provisions in the support
test that establish a presumption of self-support for taxpayers over age
twenty-five who have not recently been students.244 In any event, the
retiree problem is not an insurmountable barrier to the extension of
averaging relief for downward fluctuation. The difficulties could either
be tolerated, by allowing retirees to average, or surmounted, by writing
retirees out of the downward averaging proposal.
Finally, there are two pragmatic arguments against immediate
changes in the present system. First, the averaging mechanism would
require massive alteration to permit downward averaging, because the
present central concept of "averagable income" cannot accomplish
downward averaging. Second, implementing downward averaging
would increase revenue loss at a time when Congress is attempting to
prune such losses wherever it can, including those associated with the
241. I.R.C. § 217(c)(2)(A)-(B) (1982).
242. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(A) (1982).
243. Explicit discrimination by age is not uncommon in the Code. The averaging provisions
themselves contain one example; the I.R.C. § 1303(c)(2)(A) (1982) exception to the support re-
quirement is unavailable to individuals under age 25. The additional exemption for taxpayers
over age 65, I.R.C. § 151(c) (1982), and the capital gain exclusion for sale of a personal residence
by a taxpayer over age 55, I.R.C. § 121 (1982), are other examples.




The response to these problems is straightforward: The averaging
mechanism needs a complete overhaul. It must be retooled to focus on
the major goal-relief of fluctuation penalties. A redesigned computa-
tional framework could comfortably accommodate a downward aver-
aging mechanism. The computational framework suggested in the
preceding subsection,246 for example, would work as well for down-
ward averaging as for upward averaging. A taxpayer would simply
compute his fluctuation penalty-which he may have incurred for fluc-
tuations in either direction, or even both directions in different years-
and proceed to derive the amount by which current tax may be
reduced.
Congress could also control the revenue loss problem if it imple-
mented a new computational device. Using the computational model
of the preceding subsection, Congress could control revenue loss by ad-
justment of two key variables: the percentage fluctuation penalty that
would be considered normal, below which no relief would be available,
and the percentage of "excess fluctuation penalty" that could be
credited against the current year's taxes. For all of the reasons ad-
vanced in this article, Congress would be quite justified in setting these
variables at levels that provide only partial relief; the total dollar
amount of relief available for fluctuation penalties could thus be con-
siderably constricted. If that is done, however, it becomes all the more
important that a computational mechanism be designed to deliver that
relief to the most deserving taxpayers. This group clearly includes tax-
payers whose incomes have significantly and abruptly declined.
C. Taxpayer Averaging Accounts.
The analysis above argues that horizontal equity is best evaluated
annually, because taxpayers typically conduct their lives in accordance
with assumptions that are heavily influenced by their present situations.
The typical taxpayer lacks any certainty regarding future income
changes and thus at any given time has an ability to pay tax that is best
measured by his annual income.
There are, surely, individual cases in which the premise of this
argument is demonstrably false. The best example is Goldstein v. Com-
missioner,247 in which the taxpayers, seventy year-old Tillie Goldstein
and her retired husband, had income in 1958 of $780 from his pension,
245. See S. REP. No. 2062, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1983).
246. See supra notes 203-20 and accompanying text.
247. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
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$124.75 from interest on savings accounts, and $140,218.75 from a win-ning Irish Sweepstakes ticket. As the court drolly noted, this last item
"significantly improved petitioner's financial situation. '248 The taxpay-
ers recognized the nonrecurring nature of this income item, and, in
consultation with their accountant son, engaged in a series of leveraged
investments, whose principal object was to generate enough interest
prepayments to reduce the 1958 taxable income to approximately half
of the gross amount. There were, of course, no general income-averag-
ing provisions in 1958.249 Even the present averaging mechanism
would have only partially relieved the Goldsteins' problem. Cases like
Goldstein, and perhaps a broader range of cases for which Goldstein
may serve as a metaphor,250 seem to present the strongest case for in-
come averaging.251 It does not appear that there was any abrupt leap
in the Goldsteins' consumption pattern.252 What they really needed
was a provision that would permit them to annuitize the lump-sum re-
ceived in 1958 over their joint remaining lives-a period of some eight-
een years253-so that the income inclusion would approximately match
the expanded consumption opportunities that the sweepstakes winnings
afforded them.
One approach to these cases would be to replace the present in-
come-averaging provisions with a self-averaging device--one that
would permit future Tillie Goldsteins to bring lump sums into their
taxable income streams gradually, thereby avoiding exposure to margi-
248. Id at 736.
249. Indeed, because gambling winnings were excluded from the averaging provisions until
1969, the amounts received here were paid I 1 years too early for averaging. I.R.C. § 1302(b)(3)
disallowed wagering gains from the benefits of averaging until it was amended by the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 586-87.
250. The lottery "metaphor" may not really be a metaphor at all, because its literal truth may
be of a higher order than its representational truth. That is, the lottery is the best example, and
may be the only pure example of a large, nonrecurring receipt which is not associated with any
increased expectation of similar receipts in the future. One who writes a successful book, one who
wins a contingent-fee lawsuit, or even one who picks the winner of the Belmont Stakes is likely to
believe that elements of skill, the existence of which are verified by the success in the current year,
are likely to produce similar results in future years. It may be possible, however, to divide the
fruits of the current-year success into recurrent and nonrecurrent portions. The novelist may feel
able to produce another successful book, but perhaps not one that is quite as successful as the one
in the current year. The lottery winner can represent the novelist at least as to the incremental
success that is viewed as nonrecurrent.
251. The strength of the equitable claim for bracket relief has been recognized by Congress in
at least one situation: lump-sum distributions from qualified pension plans, which are allowed a
special ten-year averaging. See I.R.C. § 402(e) (1982).
252. The Tax Court opinion in Goldstein indicates only that the proceeds were "deposited...
in a New York bank." 44 T.C. 284, 286 (1965).
253. This is the joint and last survivor life expectancy for a pair of 70 year-olds. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.72-9 (Table II) (1983). This calculation assumes that both of the Goldsteins are 70 years old;
the opinion noted only that Tillie was 70.
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nal tax brackets that are higher than a true assessment of the taxpayers'
multiyear incomes would justify. Only in this situation does a multi-
year approach seem reasonable, because the taxpayer is clearly aware
of the nonrecurrent nature of the lump-sum payment.
The self-averaging device proposed here would be modeled on the
present Individual Retirement Account (IRA) provisions. 254 As with
IRA's, accounts for this purpose could not be commingled with any
other assets of the taxpayer and would have a special designation-
perhaps "Taxpayer Averaging Account" (TAA). Eligible for contribu-
tion would be any TAA deposits up to the amount by which the tax-
payer's tentative taxable income for the current year, computed without
any TAA deduction, exceeds some percentage-140%, for example-of
average taxable income in some preceding period of years. Thus, if the
four preceding years are chosen as the appropriate base period and to-
tal taxable income in that period is $100,000, and if the taxpayer has
taxable income in the current year of $50,000, he could contribute up to
$15,000255 to a TAA for the current tax year. The contribution actually
made would then be allowed as a deduction in the current tax year. As
in the case of IRA's, deductible contributions to TAA's should be al-
lowed with respect to a tax year as long as they are made before the due
date of the return for that year.256
The amount contributed into the TAA would be brought back into
income in future years. There are at least three ways to accomplish
this. First, it could be brought back in as the taxpayer withdraws the
funds. Second, it could be brought back into income in accordance
with a schedule that the taxpayer would be required to file at the time
of the deposit. Third, it could be brought back into income in accord
with a statutory schedule that required, for example, twenty percent
inclusion each year for a five-year period.257 To avoid the unlimited
deferral possibilities of the first two options, Congress might wish to set
some minimum annual inclusion percentage. In any of the three op-
tions, it would be sensible to tie income inclusion to fund release; that
254. I.R.C. § 219 (1982).
255. $15,000 equals tentative current-year taxable income ($50,000) less 140% of average base-
period taxable income ($35,000).
256. I.R.C. § 219(f)(3)(A) (1982) permits IRA contributions to be made on this basis.
257. I.R.C. § 402(e) (1982), the averaging provision for lump-sum distributions from qualified
pension plans, embodies an approach that is somewhat similar, in that the income is treated as
though it were received in 10% pieces for purposes of setting the marginal rates to which the lump-
sum will be exposed. The present proposal takes a different tack, since it seems preferable to
require that the excess receipts actually be set aside to verify that the taxpayer is annuitizing these
amounts, and that the amounts be taxed at the actual marginal rates applicable to that taxpayer in




is, if twenty percent of the TAA is income each year, the taxpayer could
withdraw up to that amount each year without penalty.
Absent any special provision to the contrary, this approach would
involve not only a bracket advantage to the taxpayer, which is of course
the point of the proposal, but also a tax deferral. Income would appear
on tax returns in years subsequent to its actual receipt. To avoid confer-
ring this additional deferral advantage on taxpayers, the provisions em-
bodying this proposal should compel taxpayers to compute the
additional subsequent year's tax that results from TAA inclusions and
to pay interest on that amount from the year of the original receipt of
that income.
It must be admitted that this proposal, while conceptually appeal-
ing, is not without some practical complications. These provisions,
however, are not intended to be used by any large number of taxpayers;
they are intended only to mitigate any inequities in the proposal to
repeal the present averaging provisions. There do seem to be some tax-
payers-those who are in Tillie Goldstein's position, in particular-for
whom the absence of any averaging device would be a hardship. The
TAA proposal is an attempt to provide a limited amount of relief for
such individuals. To make use of these provisions, taxpayers would
have to be willing to deal with some complexity-although it would not
seem to be an unmanageable amount. They would also have to be will-
ing to certify their recognition of the nonrecurrent nature of their cur-
rent-year income by putting it out of their reach in a TAA until it
became taxable. The device is designed to be unappealing to those who
presently are the primary beneficiaries of averaging-those whose in-
comes are growing year-by-year 258-by providing certain disincentives.
Charging interest on the tax deferred controls deferral; segregated ac-
counts with early-withdrawal penalties limits investment possibilities;
and a taxpayer with a growing income will obtain no bracket advan-
tage-indeed, he may incur a penalty-from moving taxable income to
a later year.
IV. CONCLUSION
In their twenty-year history, the federal general income-averaging
provisions have grown from a little-understood and little-used relief
measure to a major tax reduction device used mainly by taxpayers
whose incomes are large and growing. That device costs the Treasury
more than four billion dollars per year. The sole reason for these pro-
visions is the view that the horizontal equity tax policy criterion re-
258. See supra note 24.
[Vol. 1984:509
INCOME AVER4 GING
quires that taxpayers whose incomes over a five-year period are equal
should be taxed equally, regardless of the distribution of income
among the five years in the period.
This article, however, has demonstrated that a progressive tax will
not necessarily tax excessively taxpayers whose incomes fluctuate, if
their tax is measured-as it should be-in terms of utility sacrifice
rather than in terms of dollars. The period over which assessments of
utility sacrifice are to be made is essentially arbitrary, but an annual
period appears to be more satisfactory in most cases than any particular
multiyear period. The article has also demonstrated that, even if the
multiyear viewpoint is correct, the present computational framework is
so seriously flawed that the averaging provisions do little in practice to
improve the horizontal equity of the federal income tax, and slightly
lessen the vertical equity of that tax.
Earlier in the article, the averaging provisions were evaluated in
terms of various "pragmatic" tax policy criteria-those dealing with
aspects of the tax system other than its fairness. The conclusion of this
analysis was that, other than the sizable revenue loss caused by income
averaging, there are no strong policy objections to the averaging provi-
sions. On the other hand, analysis of the pragmatic policy criteria sug-
gested no significant justifications for the averaging provisions either.
The article identified one group of taxpayers for whom income
averaging may alleviate considerable unfairness: taxpayers who re-
ceive large, nonrecurring incomes in a single tax year under circum-
stances that suggest that all or part of the income will be annuitized
over the taxpayer's remaining life. Cases of this type may not be very
numerous, and designing relief for such cases that does not also pro-
vide relief where none is needed may be difficult. It may well be, there-
fore, that simple repeal of the averaging provisions is preferable to
either the present system or any alternative system. On the other hand,
use of a voluntary taxpayer averaging account system may provide in-
expensive and effective relief targeted at the nonrecurring lump-sum
problem.
Even if, contrary to the arguments in this article, Congress persists
in taking a multiyear view of horizontal equity, it should develop a
computational system for averaging that focuses directly on the prob-
lem it is intended to relieve: the incremental "fluctuation penalty" in-
curred by taxpayers whose annual incomes fluctuate.
Finally, in the interest of consistency-which is really the essence
of horizontal equity--Congress should also, if it insists on allowing
averaging when a taxpayer's income rises, make averaging available




On July 18, 1984, shortly before the final printing of this issue, the
President signed into law the Tax Reform Act of 1984, enacted as Divi-
sion A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.259 Section 173 of that Act
makes two important changes to the income averaging provisions of
the Code, effective for tax years beginning after 1983: (1) the definition
of averagable income is changed from the present 120% of average
base-period income260 to 140% of average base-period income;261 and,
(2) the base period for averaging purposes has been shortened from the
four tax years preceding the computation year262 to the three tax years
preceding the computation year.
263
These changes will not fundamentally alter the structure of the
averaging provisions. They will, however, reduce both the number of
taxpayers who will be eligible to average and the dollars saved due to
averaging for those taxpayers who remain eligible. Congress estimated
that the revenue saved by this change would be $133 million in fiscal
year 1984, $1.994 billion in fiscal year 1985, and $1.886 billion in fiscal
year 1986. 64
If one accepts the thesis of this article-that income averaging is a
largely unnecessary and somewhat expensive device, benefiting mainly
upper-bracket taxpayers-then one can only applaud any curtailment
of averaging, including that which will be accomplished by the Tax
Reform Act of 1984. On the other hand, if convinced of the soundness
of those arguments, one must regret the fact that Congress, has, in ef-
fect, chosen to pass up an opportunity to enact any true reforms in the
income-averaging area.
265
259. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
260. I.R.C. §1302(a)(1) (1982).
261. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,§ 173(b), 98 Stat. 494, 704 (1984) (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 1301).
262. I.R.C. §1302(c)(2) (1982).
263. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 173(a), 98 Stat. 494, 703 (1984) (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 1302(c)(2)).
264. COMMIrrTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON H.R. 4170, H.R. REP.
No. 432, 98 Cong., Ist Sess. 1386 (1984) [hereinafter SupplementalfReport]. Though the amend-
ments will be effective for tax years beginning in 1984, Congress apparently expects relatively
modest revenue savings in fiscal year 1984. This is presumably due to two factors: (1) there is a
slight mismatch between the federal fiscal year and calendar years (fiscal year 1984 began on
October 1, 1983); and (2) most of the revenue loss from averaging takes place in the form of
refund checks mailed back to taxpayers in the spring of the year following the year in which they
use income averaging, rather than through lower withholding over the course of the computation
year itself. See supra note 26.
265. Seasoned observers of the legislative process know better than to assume that what takes
place in a "Tax Reform Act" constitutes tax reform. Perhaps this is especially true in 1984.
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All of the basic structural problems will persist. Averaging relief
will continue to be based on an artificial formula that bears only a
rough and erratic relationship to fluctuation penalties. The $3000
threshold will remain, meaning that it will continue to be true that low-
income taxpayers must experience greater income fluctuations than
high-income taxpayers to be eligible for averaging. The formula con-
tinues to permit income changes due only to inflation to be added, in
effect, to fluctuations of real income-a problem which will assume
even greater importance once indexing takes effect,266 because indexing
will eliminate the inflation component of fluctuation penalties. 267 Dis-
crimination against taxpayers who experience fluctuation penalties be-
cause of downward income shifts will continue. And, worst of all, relief
will continue to be premised on a multiyear view of the appropriate
level of sacrifice, without any showing that such a view is justified. The
examples in the text of each of these shortcomings continue to be valid,
although the numbers, of course, will be altered somewhat by the al-
tered parameters of the averaging formula.
The sense that Congress has missed an opportunity to address
these issues is strong, in light of the fact that this part of the Code is not
one that Congress visits frequently. 268 One's regrets are tempered
somewhat, however, by the reflection that this may not have been the
best year to focus on major structural reform to income averaging. The
point of this bill seems to be to shake out whatever loose change can be
found in the furnishings of the tax system, not to replace those furnish-
266. Under present I.R.C. § l(f)(1) (1982), the first indexed-rate structure will be effective for
tax years beginning in 1985.
267. The averaging computation employs the rates for the computation year and, in effect,
projects those rates backward along with the averagable income that is spread back to the base
period. This is a modest problem under the present system, but it will assume more significance
under the indexed system, where each set of rates is specifically and uniquely developed for each
new tax year. Thus, under an indexed system, a taxpayer with income in 1985 ofx could have
increases in subsequent years that precisely matched the inflation rate ofr. He would experience
no fluctuation penalty: indexing would keep both his average and marginal rates constant. But, if
x and r were sufficiently large, he would be able to use income averaging, and would reduce his
tax liability by projecting the lower tax rate of the computation year to the averagable income.
Congress was certainly aware of this problem when it considered the Tax Reform Act of 1984;
indeed, this problem was part of what motivated the averaging amendments. Supplemental Re-
port, supra, note 264, at 1385. However, Congress has done nothing directly dealing with this
problem, except to raise the minimum x and r that will produce the effect noted purely from
inflation. If we have inflation, then, those taxpayers who are eligible to average will obtain an
inappropriate benefit to the degree that their fluctuation represents inflation: to that degree, any
incipient fluctuation penalty will have been relieved by indexing; averaging will provide a double
relief.
268. The only prior congressional amendments to the averaging provisions other than minor
conforming amendments took place in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 311, 83
Stat. 487, 586-87 (amending I.R.C. §§ 1301-1304).
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ings with anything fundamentally different. More importantly, the
possibility-although it's a faint one-that the next Congress may en-
act a genuinely flat tax rate schedule may drain Congress of any enthu-
siasm it might otherwise have to study closely those problems that a flat
tax would obliterate. Income-fluctuation penalties are such a problem.
One can only hope that after the graduated rate structure has proven its
ability to endure, Congress will then turn its attention once again to the
income-averaging provisions.
